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THE CONSTITUTION, THE WHITE HOUSE,
AND THE MILITARY HIV BAN:
A NEW THRESHOLD FOR PRESIDENTIAL
NON-DEFENSE OF STATUTES
Chrysanthe Gussis*
The President's constitutional duty to 'take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed" implies that the President is entrusted with the
responsibility to defend those laws against court challenges. On
occasion, however, Presidents faced with legislation that they deem
unconstitutional have declined to defend that legislation against
legal challenges. On February 10, 1996, President Clinton declined
to defend a provision included in the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 1996 that required discharge from the
military of all HIV-positive servicemembers because he believed that
the provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This Note explores whether President Clinton's decision
not to defend the HIV provision was appropriate as a matter of law
and policy. This Note asserts that President Clinton's decision
reflects an emerging practice that allows the President to meet a
lower threshold of unconstitutionality before declining to defend
legislation: the President may decline to defend legislation where he
determines that the legislation is probably, although not necessarily
patently, unconstitutional. This Note concludes that requiring a
lower threshold for presidential non-defense of legislation satisfies
separation of powers concerns and is appropriate as an executive
branch prerogative.
On February 10, 1996, the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1996 became law.' The Act contained a
provision requiring the discharge from the military of all
human immunodeficiency virus seropositive (HIV-positive)
servicemembers.2 When he signed the bill into law, President
Bill Clinton objected to the HIV provision, calling it unconstitu-
tional. Relying on precedent that suggests that presidential
non-defense of legislation may be appropriate where the consti-
tutionality of legislation is not a matter of clear, settled law,3
* Contributing Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume
30, 1997. B.A. 1991, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1997, University of Michigan Law
School. I appreciate Elizabeth C. Peterson's helpful edits.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 186 (1996) (amending 10 U.S.C. § 1177 (1994)).
2. See § 567, 110 Stat. at 328-29.
3. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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the President directed the Department of Justice not to defend
it against court challenges.4 Two months later, the provision
was repealed.5
This Note explores whether President Clinton's legally contro-
versial but politically popular decision not to defend the HIV
provision against legal challenges was appropriate as a matter
of law and policy. Part I describes the legislative history of the
HIV provision and details President Clinton's response to the
ban. Part I also examines public opinion regarding the proposed
discharges.
Part II asserts that President Clinton's decision not to defend
the HIV provision evinces an emerging practice that allows the
President to meet a lower threshold in determining that legisla-
tion is unconstitutional and therefore not worthy of defense by
the executive branch against legal challenges.' This Part first
discusses the President's constitutionally established duty to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."7 Part II then
delineates an emerging distinction asserted by the executive
branch between the strength of constitutional precedent neces-
sary for non-defense, as opposed to non-enforcement, of legisla-
tion it deems unconstitutional. This Part outlines standards
drawn from legal precedent that support a lower threshold for
executive branch refusals to defend a statute. While traditional-
ly the executive branch has maintained that it may decline to
defend only "patently" unconstitutional legislation, recent
practice suggests that a President may decline to defend legisla-
tion that is merely "probably" unconstitutional-where no
relevant legal precedent establishes the unconstitutionality of
the legislation, but arguments in defense of the legislation's
constitutionality are not "reasonable" or even "respectable." Part
4. See Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 260, 261 (Feb. 10, 1996) [hereinafter Signing
Statement].
5. See Act of Apr. 26, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 2707, 110 Stat. 1321, 1330; see
also 142 CONG. REC. H3930 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1996); Philip Shenon, Mandate that
H.I.V. Troops Be Discharged Is Set for Repeal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1996, at B13.
6. The concept of differing thresholds of constitutionality seems odd: legislation
is either constitutional or unconstitutional. This Note explores, however, whether it is
appropriate for the President to decline to defend only "patently" unconstitutional
legislation-where the Supreme Court has previously held the issue raised by the
legislation unconstitutional--or whether the President also may decline to defend
legislation that is "probably" unconstitutional in light of relevant judicial precedent.
Additionally, this Note explores the extent to which the President may allow his policy
goals or political agenda to inform his constitutional analysis of legislation.
7. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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II presents arguments defending and attacking the constitu-
tionality of the HIV ban, and argues that the H1V ban was at
best "probably," but certainly not "patently," unconstitutional.
Thus, President Clinton's decision not to defend the HIV ban is
consistent with a lower threshold of unconstitutionality to
warrant presidential non-defense of legislation.
Part III contemplates whether a lower threshold for non-
defense of legislation is appropriate as a matter of policy. Using
President Clinton's decision not to defend the HV provision as
a model, this Part evaluates concerns about presidential
authority to decline to defend legislation and outlines how
principles of constitutional and democratic theory may alleviate
those concerns. Part III argues that the lower threshold
reflected in President Clinton's decision not to defend the
constitutionality of the HIV provision is consistent with the
separation of powers mandated by the Constitution and is
appropriate as an executive branch prerogative.
I. THE HIV PROVISION AND PRESIDENT CLINTON'S RESPONSE
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996
contained a rider requiring the Department of Defense to dis-
charge all members of the military who tested positive for HIV.'
8. See § 567, 110 Stat. at 328. As of the law's signing in February 1996, 1049
servicemembers had tested positive for HIV. See Clinton Won't Defend HIVLaw; Repeal
Proposed, 11 AIDS POL'Y & L., Feb. 23, 1996, at 1, 10 (citing Pentagon sources); see also
Joint Statement by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff General John M. Shalikashvili (Feb. 9, 1996) (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter DOD/Joint Chiefs Statement]:
This provision will require the discharge of over 1000 service members who,
although they have tested HIV-positive, are currently deemed fit to perform their
duties. While non-deployable, they join other service members in that category.
To discharge all of these service members arbitrarily as section 567 mandates
would be both unwarranted and unwise.
Section 567 is unnecessary as a matter of sound military policy because there
is already in place a physical evaluation system to determine the fitness for duty
of HIV-positive personnel.
Discharging service members deemed fit for duty would waste the government's
investment in the training of these individuals and be disruptive to the military
programs in which they play an integral role.
There are service members who suffer from diseases that make them non-
deployable, but who are still permitted to serve their country so long as they meet
uniform retention standards. Decisions on their retention are made on an
individual basis in accordance with current regulations. Section 567 singles out
those members who are HIV-positive and requires discharge regardless of their
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Under Pentagon policy in effect since the 1980s, HIV-positive
servicemembers were allowed to remain on duty as long as they
were physically able.9 As with other chronic medical conditions,
military personnel with HIV could not be deployed overseas.'0
Yet, the earlier law protected servicemembers with HIV from
adverse employment actions based on their HIV-positive
status."
A. Legislative History
The legislative history of the Act provides little explanation
for Congress' decision to alter the established policy regarding
HIV-positive servicemembers. Congress did not conduct hear-
ings on the need for such discharges.12 The provision was
attached as a rider to a defense authorization bill that provided
$256 billion in funding for military programs, and was not
included in the original version of the bill passed in the Sen-
ate. 3 Neither house conducted debate or a direct vote on the
provision.' 4
ability to perform. This violates a standard traditionally used by the services for
retention and thus undermines a fair policy of evaluating retention on medical
and service issues on an individual basis.
Id.
9. See 10 US.C. § 1201(3)(B) (1994) (requiring 30% disability rating for medical
discharge); 10 U.S.C. § 1074 note (1994) (Restriction on Use of Information Obtained
During Certain Epidemiologic-Assessment Interviews). HIV-positive servicemembers
who were asymptomatic of the severe health complications associated with AIDS were
considered zero percent disabled. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.88b (1996).
10. See DOD/Joint Chiefs Statement, supra note 8; see also Clinton Won't Defend
HIV Law; Repeal Proposed, supra note 8, at 10 (noting that military personnel with
heart disease, cancer, or asthma cannot be deployed overseas). Servicemembers with
HIV constitute roughly one-fifth of all personnel on restricted deployment for medical
reasons. See id.; see also 142 CONG. REC. S448 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Nunn).
11. See 10 U.S.C. § 10747note ("Information obtained by the Department of Defense
during or as a result of an epidemiologic-assessment interview with [an HIV-positivel
member of the Armed Forces may not be used to support any adverse personnel action
against the member."); Doe v. Marsh, No. 89-1383-OG, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1442, at
*12 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 1990) (noting that the former policy "prohibit[ed] the [Armed Forces]
from taking 'adverse personnel action' against a soldier who tests HIV positive").
12. See 142 CONG. REc. S2294 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Nunn);
141 CONG. REc. H5790 (daily ed. June 13, 1995) (statement of Rep. Harman).
13. See 142 CONG. REc. S2294 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Nunn).
A majority of the Senate Armed Services Committee opposed the HIV provision. See 142
CONG. REC. S458 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1996).
14. See 142 CONG. REc. S2292-94 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Nunn). Several members of Congress stated that the provision was never debated in the
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A House committee report accompanying an early version of
the bill, issued without any hearings or debate, recommended
the discharge of HIV-positive servicemembers "because the
retention of such personnel degrades unit readiness and fails to
protect deployment equity among service members." 5 Aside
from this general statement, the record contained no articulated
basis for the provision or for treating HIV-positive service-
members differently than other non-deployable personnel. 6
The sponsor of the discharge provision, Representative Robert
Dornan, was the principal member of Congress advocating the
need for the ban. 7 Representative Dornan repeatedly empha-
sized his belief that HIV-positive servicemembers contracted
the virus through misconduct, stating:
[HIV] is spread by human God-given free will.... It is all
from one of three causes, all of them in violation of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. Rolling up your white,
khaki or blue uniform sleeve and sticking a contaminated
filthy needle in your arm....
Heterosexual sex with prostitutes in an off-limits pros-
titution house where all of the prostitutes are infected with
the AIDS virus . .. and the third category that seems to
drive this whole thing politically, having unprotected sex
with strangers in some hideaway or men's room somewhere,
high-risk sex with strangers that is homosexual ....
House because most members believed it would be eliminated in the Senate. See, e.g.,
141 CONG. RIc. E2417 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1995) (statement of Rep. Gunderson).
15. H.R. REP. No. 104-131, at 223 (1995). But see id. at 657 (arguing that the
support of existing policy by the Department of Defense and by all four branches of the
military is evidence that mandatory discharge of HIV-positive servicemembers is
unnecessary).
16. See 142 CONG. REC. S2294 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Nunn).
17. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. H1213-15 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996); Robert Dornan,
Oust HIV-Infected from Military, TIMEs-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Mar. 26, 1996, at B7.
Repriesentative Dornan had attempted to include a similar ban in prior defense
authorization bills. Cf. 140 CONG. REc. H4204 (daily ed. June 8, 1994) (discussing the
"Dornan language" proposed in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, 108 Stat. 2682; 139 CONG. REc. H7081, 7113 (daily ed. Sept.
28, 1993) (discussing proposed amendments to the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, 107 Stat. 1738).
18. 141 CONG. REc. H11,760 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1995); see also 142 CONG. REC.
H1213-14 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996). After the HIV provision became law, Representative
Dornan indicated that he had obtained evidence of the causes of HIV transmission
among marines. See 142 CONG. REC. H8823 (daily ed. July 30, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Doman). Representative Dornan stated that of the 56 marines who had tested positive
for HIV, none, according to Marine Corps officials, became infected through tainted
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In other statements, Representative Dornan suggested that
servicemembers afflicted with HIV were fortunate to receive
honorable discharges, citing the same reasons.19 Although
certain individual armed forces officials supported the provi-
sion,2 ° top military leaders vehemently disagreed with the
rationale for the ban and informed Congress of their opposition
to its passage.2'
B. President Clinton's Response and
the HTV Provision's Repeal
President Clinton vetoed the defense bill when it was pre-
sented initially to him, citing the HIV provision as one of his
reasons for objecting to the legislation.22
Congress revised the bill to address some of the President's
objections, but the HIV provision remained in the legislation.23
transfusions of blood or tissue products. See id. Dornan concluded from this information
that these marines contracted the virus through sex with prostitutes, same-sex sexual
conduct, or drug use. See id.
19. See 142 CONG. REc. H817 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1996) (statement of Rep. Dornan);
Dornan, supra note 17, at B7.
20. For example, in 1993, Admiral Frank Kelso, then Chief of Naval Operations,
wrote to Representative Dornan that retaining HIV-positive servicemembers significant-
ly disrupted deployment rotations. See Letter from Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, U.S.
Navy, to Representative Robert K Dornan (Sept. 2, 1993), in 142 CONG. REC. H1214-15
(daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996); see also Letter from General C.E. Mundy, Jr., U.S. Marine
Corps, to Representative Robert K. Dornan (July 23, 1993), in 142 CONG. REc. H1214;
Letter from Michael F. Ouellette, Director of Legislative Affairs, Non-Commissioned
Officers Association of the United States of America, to Representative Robert K.
Dornan (June 7, 1994), in 142 CONG. REC. H1215 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996).
21. See Letter from William Perry, Secretary of Defense, to Representative Thomas
A. Daschle, U.S. Senate Democratic Leader (Dec. 15, 1995), in 141 CONG. REC. S18,900
(daily ed. Dec. 19, 1995); see also 141 CONG. REC. S18,812 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("The Defense Department has made clear its opposition
to this requirement."); 141 CONG. REC. H14,942-43 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1995) (statement
of Rep. Solomon); John Diamond, Defense Debate Turns into Abortion, AIDS Battle,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
22. See Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996,31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
2233, 2233-34 (Dec. 28, 1995) [hereinafter Message to the House]. Other objections
included a provision limiting the President's authority to put U.S. troops under the
United Nations' control and funding for anti-missile defenses. See id. at 2234. Congress
subsequently removed these provisions. See National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 186; Signing Statement, supra note 4,
at 260.
23. See Signing Statement, supra note 4, at 260-61.
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During the ten-day presentment period, the Clinton Adminis-
tration struggled to find a way to sign the military bill and at
the same time to oppose the "completely abhorrent and offen-
sive" HIV provision.24
On February 10, 1996, President Clinton signed the legisla-
tion25 because he considered the $265 billion in funding for
military defense programs26 vital to national security and troop
morale. Nevertheless, he continued vigorously to oppose the
28HIV provision.
In a statement that accompanied the signing of the bill,
President Clinton announced his response to the HIV provi-
sion.21 Calling the ban unconstitutional, the President instruct-
ed the Attorney General not to defend the provision in court.3 0
The President called the provision "blatantly discriminatory"3 l
and noted that the discharges were not justified by any legiti-
mate medical, public health, or military objective. Relying on
the opinions of the Secretary of Defense and of the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,2 the President concluded that the
provision violated "equal protection by requiring the discharge
of qualified service members living with HIV who are medically
able to serve, without furthering any legitimate governmental
24. Alison Mitchell, President Finds a Way to Fight Mandate to Oust H.I. V Troops,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1996, at Al (quoting White House Counsel Jack Quinn).
25. See Signing Statement, supra note 4, at 260.
26. See House Republicans Bend to Clinton on Defense Bill, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 25,
1996, § 1, at 8. The Act included, among other provisions, a pay raise for service-
members, see Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 601, 110 Stat. 186, 356 (1996), funding for
construction of military facilities, see id. §§ 2001-2703, 110 Stat. at 523-43, funding for
NATO operations, see id. §§ 1331-1336, 110 Stat. at 482-85, and a new procurement
reform initiative, see id. §§ 4001-4322, 110 Stat. at 642-77.
27. Cf Signing Statement, supra note 4, at 260-61. The HIV ban may have been
a "second-tier" issue for the President. See House Republicans Bend to Clinton on
Defense Bill, supra note 26, at 8 (quoting a "senior White House official"). When the
HIV ban remained in the legislation after the first veto, it was not important enough
on its own to warrant a second veto after the President's other, more serious, policy
objections had been addressed. See id.
28. See Signing Statement, supra note 4, at 261; Memorandum on Benefits for
Military Personnel Subject to Involuntary Separation, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc.
228, 228 (Feb. 9, 1996) [hereinafter Benefits Memorandum].
29. See Signing Statement, supra note 4, at 261.
30. See id. The Department of Justice verbally advised the President on the
applicable legal standard in evaluating the constitutionality of the provision and did not
provide any written advice. See Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to Senator Orrin G. Hatch,
Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary 1 (Mar. 22, 1996) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
31. Signing Statement, supra note 4, at 261.
32. See DOD/Joint Chiefs Statement, supra note 8.
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purpose."33 The President called the provision "clearly discrimi-
natory," "wholly unwarranted," and "highly punitive."34 The
executive branch believed that its decision not to defend the law
would increase the likelihood that a court would invalidate the
law as unconstitutional.35
Concurrently, President Clinton directed various federal
agencies to enforce and implement the legislation,36 distin-
guishing enforcement from the non-defense of the legislation.37
The President also vowed to push efforts on Capitol Hill to
repeal the HIV provision. 3' Finally, because the HIV provision
denied disability benefits and health coverage to family mem-
bers of HIV-positive servicemembers,39 the President directed
the Department of Defense, the Department of Transportation,
and the Veterans Administration to take all necessary steps to
ensure that affected servicemembers and their families would
receive the full benefits "to which they would otherwise be
entitled had they continued to serve until it became medically
necessary for them to retire."' °
Ultimately, the President's repeal effort was successful. One
month after the bill was signed, the Senate voted without
debate to repeal the HIV ban and attached the repeal to an
33. Signing Statement, supra note 4, at 261.
34. Benefits Memorandum, supra note 28, at 228.
35. See White House Press Briefing by Counsel to the President Jack Quinn and
Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger 7 (Feb. 9, 1996), available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, Poltrn File [hereinafter Quinn/Dellinger Briefing] ("In our judgment-and I
think our having taken the position we do contributes to this outcome-the likelihood is
that a court will see at an early point in time that the plaintiffs in these cases have a
very high likelihood of success on the merits." (statement of White House Counsel Jack
Quinn) (emphasis added)).
36. See Signing Statement, supra note 4, at 261.
37. See Quinn/Dellinger Briefing, supra note 35, at 3. The Justice Department
advised President Clinton that because no court had determined whether the provision
was constitutional, he was obligated to enforce the law. See id. at 3 (statement of
Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger).
38. See Signing Statement, supra note 4, at 261.
39. See Benefits Memorandum, supra note 28, at 228. To receive disability benefits,
members must show at least 30% disability under the standard schedule of rating
disabilities used by the Veterans' Administration. See 10 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994). Accord-
ing to that Veterans' Administration schedule, persons with HIV who are asymptomatic
are considered zero percent disabled, and thus certain servicemembers would not be
entitled to medical or disability benefits. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.88b (1996); cf. Clinton Won't
Defend HIV Law; Repeal Proposed, supra note 8, at 10. The loss of health coverage to
family members was a critical concern; approximately 50% of servicemembers with HIV
have spouses who are also infected with the virus. See id.; Dana Priest, Army Sergeant
with HIVFeels Deserted by Policy, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1996, at A3 (noting Department
of Defense data that one-half of the servicemembers infected with HIV are married).
40. Benefits Memorandum, supra note 28, at 228; see also Signing Statement,
supra note 4, at 261.
WINTER AND SPRING 1997] Presidential Non-Defense of Statutes 599
omnibus budget bill by unanimous consent.4' On April 25, 1996,
the repeal was passed by both houses, just two months after the
legislation was enacted.42
C. Public Opinion
President Clinton's opposition to the HIV ban, and its subse-
quent repeal, reflected public opinion about the provision.
Popular sentiment appeared sympathetic toward service-
members discharged under the provision, and supported the
President's disapproval of the ban. 43 Moreover, public opposition
41. See John Diamond, Senate Moves to Junk Law on Military AIDS Discharges:
Wide Spectrum of Groups Opposes Bill Requiring Expulsion of HIV Positive Soldiers,
ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar. 20, 1996, at 30A; Janet Hook, Senate Rejects Law to Oust HIV
Carriers from Military, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1996, at Al.
42. See Act of April 25, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 2707, 110 Stat. 1321, 1330; see
also Eric Pianin & John F. Harris, Clinton, Congress Reach '96 Budget Agreement:
Funding Restored for Some White House Priorities; Targeted Agencies Appear to Face
Less Drastic Cuts, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 1996, at Al. Representative Dornan subse-
quently reinserted the HIV discharge provision in the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1997, but the conference committee removed it. See 142 CONG. Rc.
S10,125-27 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996); 142 CONG. REC. H9821 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996);
see also 142 CONG. REC. H4927 (daily ed. May 14, 1996).
43. See Editorial, A Backward Measure, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Feb. 12, 1996,
at 20, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File ("In the military, as in profes-
sional sports, it's time to go forward, not back."); A Law Not Worth Defending, ROCKY
MTN. NEWS, Feb. 14, 1996, at 47A (opposing HIV ban and stating that "[iut's a stupid
law, and Clinton is right not to defend it'); A Well-Aimed Bout for HIV Rule: House
Should Follow Senate Lead on Military Discharge Mandate, L.A- TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996,
at B8, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (opposing the HIV provision as
"senseless,' "mean-spirited," and "a shameful waste'); Another HIV Setback, SEATTLE
TIMES, Feb. 8, 1996, at B4, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (opposing
the HIV ban and stating that "Dornan's rider has the odor of brimstone instead of
thoughtful public policy"); Clinton Zaps Defense Bill's 2 Clinkers, MORNING CALL
(Allentown), Feb. 13, 1996, at A10, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File ("It
is medically unsound. Congress should repeal it immediately.. .'."); Crossing the Line:
Law to Compel the Discharge of HIV Positive Military Personnel, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb.
19, 1996, at 9, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File ("The military, which
has an exemplary record in dealing with HIV-positive personnel, didn't want it. . .. ");
HIV and DoD, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1996, at A14 (opposing the HIV provision and
stating that President Clinton "is right to condemn Rep. Dornan's handiwork and
pledge every effort to get it repealed or overturned by the courts'); HIV Policy: Military
Should be Consistent on Medical Discharges, DALLAS MORNING NEwS, June 20, 1995,
at 10A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (calling the ban "misguided"
and noting that the purported rationales, if sound, ought to apply to all disabling
medical conditions); Ill-considered Policies: HIV, B-2 Measures are shortsighted Politics,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TREB., Feb. 13, 1996, at B-8, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File (stating that the provision is "wrongheaded" and "morally indefensible"
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did not break down along political party lines. Conservative
commentators, government officials, and sports figures,
including Earvin "Magic" Johnson, all expressed outrage at the
provision and called for its repeal." The quick repeal of the
provision was certainly prompted in part by public disapproval
of the ban. One Senate aide noted that opponents of the repeal
seemed to shy away from a fight because it was "clearly a losing
cause."45 Finally, the punitive nature of Representative
Dornan's rationale for the ban4" did not mirror public
sentiment. Opinion polls have demonstrated a decline in the
because it forces discharge of "productive" asymptomatic personnel); Charles
Krauthanmner, The GOP'S HlVDisgrace, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1996, at A19 ("It is hard
to imagine a more mean-spirited and useless provision in any bill. On the merits, it is
simply a manifestation of bigotry."); Legal Discrimination in Armed Services,
TENNESEAN, Feb. 15, 1996, at 12A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
(opining that the ban "makes no sense medically or militarily"); Tom Teepen, Congress
Returns to the Dark Ages on HIV Policy for the Military, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 11,
1996, available in 1996 WL 8188637 (urging "quick adoption" of bills repealing the ban
on grounds of "[clommon decency and national self-respect"); Unfair Ban on HIV in
Uniform, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 12, 1996, at A-16, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File (calling the HIV provision "ill-considered" and "distasteful"); DeWayne
Wickham, Given a Choice-Better to be in a Foxhole with Magic than Dornan, GANNETr
NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 1, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (arguing
that prior military HIV policy "makes sense" but that the new rule does not). But see
Mario Battista, People Who are HIV-Positive Don't Belong in the Military, ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES, June 17, 1995, at 17A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
(supporting discharge policy because all military service involves physical danger).
Public sympathy may reflect the change in attitudes toward HIV that occurred as
more information about the virus became available. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, AIDS Knowledge and Attitudes for 1992: Data from the National Health
Interview Survey, ADVANCE DATA, Feb. 23, 1994, at 1, 5 (documenting a drop in public
belief in a likelihood of HIV transmission from casual contact and an increase in
persons who had a friend or coworker with HIV or AIDS); Teepen, supra (noting recent
polls evidencing that the public has shed early panic about AIDS and that most people
understand how the virus is transmitted and would not deny work to persons with
HV); see also Gallup Poll Shows Rise in Compassion for Victims of AIDS, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 1987, at 48 [hereinafter Gallup Poll] (revealing increased public compassion
for victims of the disease and rising support for protecting HIV-positive persons against
dismissal from their jobs).
Professional associations, including the American Medical Association, American
Dental Association, and American Nurses Association, also opposed mandatory
discharge of HIV-positive troops and supported the position that there was no public
health or medical need for the ban. See H. REP. No. 104-563, at 722 (1996).
44. See, e.g., Lou Chibbaro Jr., Gingrich Goes One-On-One with Magic, WASH.
BLADE, Feb. 16, 1996, at 19 (describing Earvin "Magic" Johnson's efforts to get the
discharge provision repealed); Charles Krauthammer, supra note 43, at A19 (calling the
discharge provision a "disgrace"); This Week With David Brinkley (ABC television
broadcast, Feb. 4, 1996), available in LEXIS, -News Library, ABCNws file (statement
of George Will) (calling the HIV discharge provision "a terrible injustice").
45. Hook, supra note 41, at Al.
46. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
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belief that AIDS represents a "'divine punishment for moral
decline.' "47
II. PRESIDENT CLINTON'S DECISION:
A NEW THRESHOLD FOR NON-DEFENSE
A. The President's Duty:
Faithful Execution of Laws
The Constitution mandates that Congress legislate,4 that the
President faithfully execute that legislation,49 and that the
judiciary resolve disputes about the legislation's validity.5 ° The
President's duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully ex-
ecuted"5 not only requires enforcement, but also implies the
President's responsibility to defend the laws against attacks in
court.5 2
Traditionally, courts have held that after the opportunity to
veto has passed, the President cannot suspend or ignore any fed-
eral statute on the grounds that it is unconstitutional.53 The
executive branch itself has maintained a strict view of the Presi-
dent's constitutional duty to treat a law as valid, holding the
execution of laws to be paramount.' The underlying rationale
47. Gallup Poll, supra note 43, at 48 (quoting statement with which poll respon-
dents were asked to agree or disagree).
48. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
49. See id. art. II, § 3.
50. See id. art. III, § 2.
51. See id. art. II, § 3.
52. See Gavett v. Alexander, 477 F. Supp. 1035, 1044 (D.D.C. 1979) (holding
unconstitutional a statute section that required the Secretary of the Army to sell
surplus arms at cost only to National Rifle Association members and that was not
defended by the executive branch and noting that the presidential decision to decline
to defend legislation interferes with the President's duty faithfully to execute laws and
therefore should not be undertaken without "the weightiest of reasons"); Note, Executive
Discretion and the Congressional Defense of Statutes, 92 YALE L.J. 970, 970 (1983)
(asserting that the President's duty to execute laws includes defending those laws in
court).
53. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)
("The Constitution limits [the President's] functions in the lawmaking process to the
recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad."); Kendall
v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 612 (1838) ("To contend that the obligation
imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid
their execution, is a novel construction of the constitution, and entirely inadmissible.").
54. See Rendition of Opinions on Constitutionality of Statutes-Federal Home Loan
Bank Act, 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 11, 14 (1937) ("[Tlhere rarely can be proper occasion for the
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for this strict standard is that, in most cases, the judiciary can
be relied upon to invalidate unconstitutional laws.55
Despite this strong presumption that a President is required
to treat a law as valid, the executive branch has long asserted
the authority to decline execution of laws it deems unconstitu-
tional.56 Courts implicitly have approved of this authority.57
Moreover, the constitutional framers apparently contemplated
such authority.5
rendition of an opinion by the Attorney General upon [a statute's] constitutionality after
it has become law."); Income Tax--Salaries of President and Federal Judges, 31 Op. Att'y
Gen. 475, 476 (1919) ("[W]hen an act like this ... is passed it is the duty of the executive
department to administer it until it is declared unconstitutional by the courts."); see also
The Attorney General's Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally- Objectionable
Legislation, 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55, 59 (1980) ("I do not believe that the preroga-
tive of the Executive is to exercise free and independent judgment on constitutional
questions presented by Acts of Congress.').
55. See 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55, 59 (1980). Increased decisions by Presidents
to decline to defend statutes on constitutional grounds may suggest that the judiciary
cannot be relied upon as heavily to resolve constitutional disputes. The lack of clear
constitutional guidelines from the Court on many issues of public debate may be, in part,
the cause of more presidential decisions not to defend objectionable legislation. See
discussion infra Part III.B.5.
56. Opinions dating back to at least 1860 assert the President's authority to decline
to execute legislation he considers unconstitutional. See, e.g., Memorial of Captain
Meigs, 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 462, 469-70 (1860) (asserting that the President need not
enforce a statute purporting to appoint a military officer). See generally Presidential
Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, Op. Off. Legal Counsel (Nov.
2, 1994); 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55 (1980); Political Activity by State or Local
Employees, 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 158 (1942).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), was probably the first case in
which the President made no effort to defend an act of Congress on constitutional
grounds (noting President Jefferson's claim that the Court had no authority to decide
the case at all).
57. See, e.g., Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (agreeing that the President has "the power to veto encroaching laws ... or even
to disregard them when they are unconstitutional'); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States,
295 U.S. 602 (1935) (rejecting President Roosevelt's assertion that a provision of the
Federal Trade Commission Act was unconstitutional, but not addressing the propriety
of the President's non-compliance); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (striking
down a statute as an unconstitutional limitation on presidential removal power without
suggesting that the President had overstepped his authority when he declined to
enforce or defend the statute, even though there was no Supreme Court precedent on
point and the statute was not clearly unconstitutional); see also INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 942 n.13 (1983) (noting that Presidents often sign legislation containing
constitutionally objectionable provisions); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at
635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (recognizing the existence of the President's authority
to act contrary to a statutory command).
58. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. John Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 8
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1801-1806, at 311 n.1 (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,
1897) (writing, with respect to the Alien and Sedition Laws, that "the Executive,
believing the law to be unconstitutional, was bound to remit the execution of it; because
that power has been confided to him by the Constitution. That instrument meant that
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The authority to decline to execute unconstitutional statutes
accommodates the conflict between the President's oath of office
and the constitutional mandate that the President execute the
laws. The oath of office requires the President to "preserve,
protect and defend the Constitution,"59 the "supreme Law" of
the land.6° The oath ensures that a President who signs a law
is not only a participant in the legislative process but also an
officer responsible for upholding the Constitution.61
its coordinate branches should be checks on each other."); Statement of James Wilson
on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Dec. 1, 1787), reprinted in 2 DEBATES ON
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 418, 445-46 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., J.B. Lippincott
1937) (1836), cited in Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional
Statutes, Op. Off. Legal Counsel app. at vi (Nov. 2, 1994):
[I]t is possible that the legislature... may transgress the bounds assigned to it,
and an act may pass, in the usual mode, notwithstanding that transgression; but
when it comes to be discussed before the judges ... it is their duty to pronounce
it void .... In the same manner, the President of the United States could shield
himself, and refuse to carry into effect an act that violates the Constitution.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
59. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
60. Id. art. VI, cl. 2. In addition, all public officers are required to support the
Constitution. See id. cl. 3; see also 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (1994) (requiring elected or appointed
officials in the civil or uniformed services to swear to support and defend the Constitu-
tion).
61. See Op. Off. Legal Counsel 2 (Nov. 2, 1994) ("[The President is required to act
in accordance with the laws-including the Constitution, which takes precedence over
other forms of law."); 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55, 59 (1980) (noting that in rare cases
"the Executive's duty to the constitutional system may require that a statute be chal-
lenged.... .); General Education Provisions Act-Congress' Disapproval of Department
of Education Regulations by Resolutions Not Presented to the President Is Unconstitu-
tional, 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 25, at 11 (June 5, 1980):
[The Executive's duty faithfully to execute the law embraces a duty to enforce the
fundamental law set forth in the Constitution as well as a duty to enforce the law
founded in the Acts of Congress, and cases arise in which the duty to the one
precludes the duty to the other.
Id.; see also TERRY EASTLAND, ENERGY IN THE ExEcuTrvE: THE CASE FOR THE STRONG
PRESIDENCY 73 (1992); Note, supra note 52, at 972 (noting that when the President
faces a law that he believes is unconstitutional, he must decide whether the law should
be executed as written and defended if attacked, or whether the duty of faithfulness to
the Constitution requires its repudiation); cf United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703
(1974) ("In the performance of assigned constitutional duties, each branch of the
Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its
powers by any branch is due great respect from the others.").
In fact, even where a President fully supports legislation he has signed from a policy
standpoint, commentators have maintained that, strictly speaking, only those portions
that are constitutional become law. See EASTLAND, supra, at 75; see also John Hart Ely,
United States v. Lovett: Litigating the Separation of Powers, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
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B. Non-Defense Distinguished from Non-Enforcement:
A Lower Threshold Emerges
Although President Clinton ordered the Department of Jus-
tice not to defend the HIV provision against challenges in
court,62 he determined that he was required to enforce, or
implement, the HIV provision because no court had ruled on
the constitutionality of such a ban.63 President Clinton's action
elucidates an emerging distinction between the executive
branch's duty to enforce a law, and its responsibility to defend
a statute if it is challenged in court. The determination not to
defend the HIV provision marks the executive branch's first
explicit assertion that such a decision faces a different, lower
threshold than a decision not to enforce legislation.
Traditionally, the executive branch has taken the position
that the President should enforce a law unless Supreme Court
precedent dictates that it is unconstitutional.64 If the President
believes that the Supreme Court would sustain the legislation
as constitutional, he must enforce it regardless of his
independent personal belief regarding the legislation's constitu-
tionality.6 This view finds support in case law. 66 The executive
REv., 1, 4 (1975) (citing President Roosevelt's opinion that the provision at issue in
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), was unconstitutional and therefore not
binding).
On the other hand, Presidents can accept a provision they believe to be unconsti-
tutional if it advances their agenda. For example, the Reagan Administration accepted
a limited congressional veto in exchange for renewed funding for the Contras. See
Michael Strine, Counsels to the President: The Rise of Organizational Competition, in
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS: THE FEDERAL LEGAL BUREAUCRACY AND PRESIDENTIAL
POLITICS 257, 274 (Cornell W. Clayton ed., 1995). Such behavior raises accountability
problems; where Congress and the President both agree to support an unconstitutional
law, invalidation will result only from a suit brought by the public to the judiciary.
62. See Signing Statement, supra note 4, at 261.
63. See Quinn/Dellinger Briefing, supra note 35, at 3 ("And the President can
decline to comply with the law, in our view, only where there is a judgment that the
Supreme Court has resolved the issue.") (remarks of Assistant Attorney General Walter
Dellinger); see also id. ("[I]n circumstances where you don't have the benefit of such a
prior judicial holding, it's appropriate and necessary to enforce [a statute].') (remarks
of White House Counsel Jack Quinn).
64. See Quinn/Dellinger Briefing, supra note 35, at 3.
65. See, e.g., Op. Off. Legal Counsel 2 (Nov. 2, 1994).
66. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38, 647
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that a court may sustain presidential action in
contravention of a legislative mandate "only by disabling the Congress from acting upon
the subject" (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)), and refusing to rely on
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branch has, however, advanced two circumstances under which
the President may sign legislation containing desirable provi-
sions yet refuse to defend an element of the legislation that the
President believes is constitutionally deficient. 7 First, the
"unadjudicated claims of power"); see also Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102,
1121 (9th Cir. 1988) (determining that the prevailing party was entitled to attorneys'
fees because the executive branch acted in bad faith in refusing to execute provisions
of the Competition in Contracting Act and stating that the President's action was
'utterly at odds with the texture and plain language of the Constitution, and with
nearly two centuries of judicial precedent"), withdrawn in part, 893 F.2d 205, 208 (9th
Cir. 1990) (en banc) (ruling that Lear Siegler was not a prevailing party and therefore
withdrawing a section of the opinion quoted above).
Presidents have declined to enforce legislation in situations where no court had
decided the constitutional issue involved, and courts did not criticize this decision in
subsequent litigation. See, e.g., Myers, 272 U.S. at 52. Myers involved President
Woodrow Wilson's refusal to enforce a statute that prevented him from removing
postmasters without obtaining Senate approval. President Wilson did not enforce the
legislation despite the fact that the statute was not manifestly unconstitutional, and
there was no relevant Supreme Court precedent. See id. at 107. The Court ultimately
struck down the Myers statute as an unconstitutional limitation on the President's
removal power, but no member of the Court suggested that Wilson overstepped his
constitutional authority, or even acted improperly, by refusing to comply with a statute
that he believed was unconstitutional. See id. at 176; see also Op. Off. Legal Counsel
3-4 (Nov. 2, 1994) (arguing that "[t]he Court in Myers can be seen to have implicitly
vindicated the view that the President may refuse to comply with a statute that limits
his constitutional powers if he believes it is unconstitutional"). But cf Lear Siegler, Inc.,
842 F.2d at 1121-22 n.14 (rejecting the executive branch's argument that because the
Court did not criticize the propriety of presidential non-enforcement in Myers, 272 U.S.
at 52, and in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), the Court
tacitly approved of those actions).
67. Where Presidents have declined to enforce a statute, they have also declined
to defend it. See, e.g., Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 602; Myers, 272 U.S. at 52. There
are no instances where Presidents have not enforced, yet have defended, legislation.
The executive branch also has argued against the constitutionality of a statute in
court where either there was no occasion for the executive branch to enforce or
implement the statute before litigation or where the statute did not provide for any
executive branch implementation. See, e.g., Hechinger v. Metropolitan Wash. Airports
Auth., 845 F. Supp. 902, 904 (D.D.C.) (noting that the United States filed a statement
of interest in which it challenged the constitutionality of a board established by federal
statute), affd, 36 F.3d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995); Synar v.
United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1379 (D.D.C.) (noting the position of the United
States "that the [Gramm-Rudman-Hollings] Act does not unconstitutionally delegate
legislative authority but that the role of the Comptroller General in the automatic
deficit reduction process violates the principle of separation of powers"), affd sub nom.
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); In re Benny, 44 B.R. 581, 583 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(noting that the United States filed intervention papers challenging the constitutional-
ity of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984), affd, 812 F.2d
1133 (9th Cir. 1987).
That the HIV provision required the executive branch to do something, namely,
discharge HIV-positive servicemembers, arguably bolsters the justification for the
President's decision not to defend legislation. Where legislation requires affirmative
action by the executive branch, executive branch analysis-and approval--of the
legislation's constitutionality should be stricter than in .cases where the executive
branch is not required to carry out action in accordance with the legislation.
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President may decline to defend statutes that, in his opinion,
unconstitutionally encroach on the authority or powers of the
presidency. 8 Second, the executive branch has asserted that it
is not required to defend statutes that are "clearly" or "patent-
ly" unconstitutional.69 When the President declines to defend
68. See Op. Oft Legal Counsel 3 (Nov. 2, 1994); 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 11, 16 (1937);
Department of Justice Press Release, Attorney General William French Smith (May 6,
1982) [hereinafter Smith Press Release] ("T]he Department of Justice has the responsi-
bility to defend acts of Congress unless they intrude on executive powers or are clearly
unconstitutional."); see also 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55, 56 (1980).
Specific examples of presidential refusal to defend legislation on these grounds can
be found in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693-96 (1988), and INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983).
The President may have more latitude to refuse to defend provisions that encroach
on the President's constitutional powers than to refuse to defend statutes on other
grounds because "it is well understood that the best way to reach a constitutional
equilibrium in this area is for each branch to vigorously enforce its own interests." John
0. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A Normative,
Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 375, 388-89 n.44 (1993)
[hereinafter McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function]; see Op. Off. Legal Counsel 3
(Nov. 2, 1994); John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign
Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers,
56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 313 (1993) ("The judiciary would lose a measure of its
most prized prerogative, the protection of individual constitutional rights, if the execu-
tive were to refuse to enforce provisions that violate individual rights as freely as it
refuses to enforce provisions that violate the separation of powers.").
Thus, the president may be on stronger legal ground in refusing to execute laws that
encroach on his authority rather than relying on another stated rationale. Where he de-
clines to enforce on a different basis he may be, however, more honest to the political
issue at stake. The increased "lawyerization" of political disputes frequently submerges
the real disputes about substantive choices beneath distracting contests over abstract
separation of powers principles. See Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the
Presidency, 1995 BYU L. REV. 17, 85.
69. See Representation of Congress and Congressional Interests in Court: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong. 10 (1976) [hereinafter Congressional Interests Hearings] (statement of Rex
Lee, Assistant Attorney General) ("Mhe Department will not defend against a claim
of unconstitutionality... where the Attorney General believes, not only personally as
a matter of conscience, but also in his official capacity as the Chief Legal Officer of the
United States, that a law is so patently unconstitutional that it cannot be defended."
(emphasis added)); accord 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55 (1980); Smith Press Release,
supra note 68 ("Mhe Department of Justice has the responsibility to defend acts of
Congress unless they intrude on executive powers or are clearly unconstitutional...
." (emphasis added)). Webster's Dictionary defines "patently" as 'clearly," "obviously,"
or "plainly." WEBSTER'S THiRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1654 (1986). Roget's
Thesaurus suggests 'undeniable,"'unmistakable," and "incontrovertible" as synonyms
for the adjective "patent." ROGET'S THESAURUS 489 (Doubleday 1977).
When faced with presidential decisions to decline to defend legislation, courts have
not acknowledged any impropriety in the President's actions and have confirmed the
constitutionality of his conclusion. See discussion infra Part II.B.
Courts have supported explicitly state attorneys general who have asserted this
authority. See e.g., Delchamps, Inc. v. Alabama State Milk Control Bd., 324 F. Supp.
117 (D. Ala. 1971) (holding that the Alabama attorney general was not under a duty to
defend statute he believed was unconstitutional).
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statutes that violate individual constitutional liberties, as the
HIV provision is alleged to do, he faces this "patently" unconsti-
tutional standard.7 0 Yet, in cases involving individual constitu-
tional rights, Supreme Court guidance is often limited.7' Thus,
the line distinguishing whether legislation will be deemed
constitutional or "patently" unconstitutional proves difficult to
draw. A review of prior instances of presidential non-defense of
statutes provides some, albeit insufficient, guidance.
Before 1977, the executive branch enforced, but did not
defend, legislation infringing on individual constitutional
rights in only two instances.72 In United States v. Lovett,73 the
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a provision,
inserted in an appropriations bill, which singled out certain
federal employees as dangerous and unfit for government
service and withheld their salaries. 74 President Franklin Roo-
sevelt signed the bill because it appropriated wartime defense
funds that he believed were imperative. 75 Although he enforced
the statute, President Roosevelt declined to defend it in court
because he believed the provision was unconstitutional.7 6 Con-
gress authorized a special counsel to defend the statute as
amicus curiae.77 The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the
President's belief, holding that the provision was an uncon-
stitutional bill of attainder.7" Furthermore, no Justice
70. There appear to be no court adjudications of a President's decision not to
enforce or implement legislation on the grounds that individual constitutional liberties
would be violated. The executive branch, however, has asserted that it possesses the
authority to decline to enforce legislation on these grounds. See Op. Off. Legal Counsel
2-3 (Nov. 2, 1994) (stating that presidential determination as to whether to comply with
a provision should be reached "after careful weighing of the effect of compliance with
the provision on the constitutional rights of affected individuals").
71. See discussion infra Part III.B.5.
72. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 306 (1946); Simkins v. Moses H.
Cone Mem'l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
These cases are distinguished from instances of presidential non-defense asserted on
separation of powers grounds.
73. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
74. See id. at 305, 308-12.
75. See id. at 305 n.1. Upon signing the bill, President Roosevelt stated, "The
Senate yielded, as I have been forced to yield, to avoid delaying our conduct of the
war. But I cannot so yield without placing on record my view that this provision is not
only unwise and discriminatory, but unconstitutional." Id. at 313 (citation omitted).
76. See id. at 305 n.1. A majority of the Senate also believed that the statute was
unconstitutional, but passed the bill "only because it was a rider to a necessary
appropriations bill and after several conferences the House refused to recede."
Congressional Interests Hearings, supra note 69, at 10 (statement of Rex Lee).
77. See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 306.
78. See id. at 315.
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suggested that the President had overstepped his authority, or
even acted improperly, by refusing to defend the statute.
In 1963, President John F. Kennedy enforced, but declined to
defend, a separate-but-equal provision of a law that provided
federal funding for racially segregated hospitals.79 The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit struck down the provision.8 ° The
Supreme Court previously had "settled beyond question" that
the validity of state-supported racial discrimination was "fore-
closed as a litigable issue.""'
The decisions not to defend legislation in these two early
cases evince inconsistent standards for assessing the propriety
of presidential non-defense of a statute. Simkins promotes a
standard for non-defense equal to the standard for non-
enforcement: there must be existing Supreme Court precedent
on the constitutional issue before a President may decline to
defend legislation. Lovett implies that non-defense may be
appropriate where the constitutionality of a statute is not a
matter of clear, settled law. Lovett therefore promotes a lower
threshold for presidential non-defense of statutes.82 Signifi-
cantly, President Clinton relied upon Lovett in making his
determination to decline to defend the HIV provision. 3
More recent case law supports the standard employed by the
executive branch in Lovett: presidential non-defense is war-
ranted even if there is not a relevant constitutional issue.
4
79. See Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 962 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
80. See id. at 969.
81. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 US. 31, 33 (1962) (per curiam) (vacating and remand-
ing for "expeditious disposition" of black plaintiffs rights to non-segregated trans-
portation service).
82. The Simkins standard conforms more easily to the plain meaning of the term
"patently" unconstitutional. See discussion supra note 69; cf. Arthur S. Miller &
Jeffrey H. Bowman, Presidential Attacks on the Constitutionality of Federal Statutes:
A New Separation of Powers Problem, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 51, 58 (1979) ("It is one thing
for the Department of Justice to attack a statute when all, including Congress, can
see that the statute is invalid; and quite another to do so when the essence of the
dispute lies between the President and Congress.").
83. See Quinn/Dellinger Briefing, supra note 35, at 4-5 (citing President Roose-
velt's action as precedent); cf Signing Statement, supra note 4, at 261 (citing President
Roosevelt's decision to sign the funding bill at issue in Lovett despite his objection to
a provision that infringed upon individual rights).
84. Since 1977, there have been a number of instances in which the executive
branch has declined to defend, but at the same time has enforced, federal legislation it
asserts is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 560, 576
(1990) (complying with a statute forbidding review of or changes to FCC minority
ownership policies, but questioning whether the existing preference policies violated
the Equal Protection Clause), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.
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For example, in League of Women Voters v. FCC,85 the Justice
Department declined to defend the Public Broadcasting Act of
1967, which prohibited noncommercial television licensees from
editorializing, endorsing, or opposing candidates for public
office.8" The executive branch declined to defend the statute, 7
asserting that the prohibition violated the First Amendment
and that "reasonable" arguments could not be advanced to
defend the legislation against constitutional challenge.8 8 Despite
Ct. 2097, 2111 (1995); League of Women Voters v. FCC, 489 F. Supp. 517, 520-21 (C.
Cal. 1980) (refusing to defend provisions of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, 47
U.S.C. § 399 (1982)), amended by 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1988), that prohibited certain
speech, but enforcing the statute to provoke "test litigation"), affd, 468 U.S. 364
(1984); Gavett v. Alexander, 477 F. Supp. 1035, 1043-44, 1051 (D.D.C. 1979) (enforc-
ing a statute permitting the sale of surplus rifles at cost to NRA members only, but
declining to defend it on the grounds that it violated the Equal Protection Clause).
The executive branch also declined to defend a provision of the Social Security Act
that allowed a wife, but not a husband, of a disabled wage earner with children to
receive special benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 402(e) (1976), in a series of cases. See Vitale v.
Harris, 507 F. Supp. 854 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Ambrose v. Califano, No. 79-52 (D. Or. July
17, 1980); Yates v. Califano, 471 F. Supp. 84 (W.D. Ky. 1979). These cases, however,
may provide support for the "settled beyond question" threshold suggested by
Simkins: the Supreme Court had already held the statutory scheme concerned uncon-
stitutional. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 216-17 (1977).
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the executive branch complied with
the "must-carry" provisions of a cable broadcasting act, passed by Congress over
President Bush's veto on constitutional grounds, but refused to defend the provisions
in court. The Clinton Administration subsequently defended the provisions, and the
courts validated their constitutionality. See 810 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1992), enforced,
819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), affd on reh'g, 910 F.
Supp. 734 (D.D.C. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 907 (1996).
85. 489 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
86. See id. at 520-21.
87. After the Justice Department declined to defend the statute, the Senate
appeared as amicus curiae at the district court level and argued that the suit should
be dismissed because the FCC agreed with the opposing party that the statute was
unconstitutional. See id. at 518. The district court granted the motion to dismiss on the
grounds of lack of adverse parties and ripeness, because it determined that the FCC
was unlikely to penalize the plaintiff. See id. at 520-21. The court did not remark on
the propriety of the non-defense decision, but stressing the need for adverse parties, it
stated:
It is not without consequence that the decision not to argue in favor of the statute
is being made by the Executive Branch. That fact colors the litigation in that a
conflict between the Legislative and Executive branches is presented by the
passage of the statute by the one and the decision by the other to acquiesce in a
declaration that the statute is unconstitutional. Hence this suit is flavored by a
sub silentio prayer by the Executive branch for action by the Judicial branch that
it cannot take itself.
Id. at 520-21.
88. See Letter from Benjamin Civiletti, Assistant Attorney General, to Michael
Davidson, Senate Legal Counsel (Oct. 11, 1979) (on file with Senate Legal Counsel); see
also Letter from William F. Smith, Attorney General, to Senators Strom Thurmond and
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the executive branch's assertion in League of Women Voters that
no "reasonable" arguments could be advanced to defend the
statute, the Administration appeared to have been aware of
strong constitutional arguments in support of the statute.8 9 The
statute was not therefore "patently" unconstitutional in ac-
cordance with the "foreclosed as litigable" standard employed in
Simkins.9 Rather, facing no clear guidance from Supreme
Court case law as to the constitutionality of the statute and
recognizing that arguments existed on both sides of the dispute,
the White House determined its position using policy goals and
political agenda to inform its determination. 9' The Supreme
Court ultimately held that the statute violated the First
Amendment.
9 2
Subsequent statements by executive branch officials provide
support for requiring a less stringent constitutional evaluation
by the executive branch before it decides not to defend legisla-
tion. According to these officials, a President may decline to
defend a statute where no "respectable" argument can be
advanced in its support.93
Joseph Biden (Apr. 6, 1981) ("In my view, the Department has the duty to defend an
Act of Congress whenever a reasonable argument can be made in its support, even if the
Attorney General and the lawyers examining the case conclude that the argument may
ultimately be unsuccessful in the courts."), quoted in Note, supra note 52, at 976 n.21.
In Gavett, the executive branch also asserted that "reasonable" arguments could not
be advanced in defense of the statute. See 477 F. Supp. at 1044. Citing Simkins, 323
F.2d at 962, the court noted that on rare occasions the executive branch has declined
to defend laws it considers unconstitutional, and that "while such a determination is
not binding upon the Court, it constitutes a significant circumstance which should be
accorded some weight." 477 F. Supp. at 1044.
89. See DOJAuthorization and Oversight, 1981: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 855 (1980); Publication of a Notice from the Senate Legal
Counsel, 125 CONG. REC. 35,416 (1979). For a discussion of the arguments in support
of the statute, see Note, supra note 52, at 975 n.18.
90. See Note, supra note 52, at 976 (asserting this view); see also supra notes 80-81
and accompanying text.
91. See Note, supra note 52, at 976 (arguing that the executive branch decision not
to defend the statute at issue in League of Women Voters was made for political
reasons); see also infra note 168 and accompanying text.
92. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
93. See, e.g., Congressional Interests Hearings, supra note 69, at 151 (urging that
the executive branch should defend statutes unless "'no respectable argument" is
available (testimony of Simon Lazarus) (quoting Robert L. Stern, Solicitor General's
Office)); see also Drew S. Days III, Ninth Judge Mac Swinford Lecture delivered at the
University of Kentucky College of Law, In Search of the Solicitor General's Clients: A
Drama with Many Characteristics, (Nov. 10, 1994), in 83 KY. L.J. 485, 499-500 & n.71
(1994-95) (arguing that non-defense may be appropriate where "no professionally
respectable argument can be made in defense of the statute" (quoting Joshua I.
Schwartz, Two Perspectives on the Solicitor General's Independence, 21 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 1119, 1153-54 (1988))).
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C. Constitutionality of the HIV Ban:
Arguments on Both Sides
As the discussion in Part II.B reveals, a review of previous
application of the "patently" unconstitutional standard provides
insufficient guidance as to what level of uncertainty vis-a-vis
the constitutionality of a statute is sufficient before the Presi-
dent may decline to defend it in court. The more recent exam-
ples of presidential non-defense of legislation suggest that
where existing case law does not speak directly to the issue,
and "reasonable" arguments in support of the legislation cannot
be countenanced, a President may decline to defend the legisla-
tion. Under these circumstances, a President may take the
position he deems most "respectable." What is considered
unconstitutional then is determined, in effect, by the position
that best promotes a President's policy concerns or political
agenda. To determine whether President Clinton's decision to
decline to defend the HIV ban reflects this standard, an inquiry
into the arguments on both sides of the constitutionality of the
HIV provision is appropriate.
1. Arguments in Defense of Constitutionality-Congress
could have asserted a number of strong arguments in support
of the HIV ban:
Judicial Deference to Congress. The Constitution bestows
upon Congress responsibility for establishing regulations gov-
erning the armed forces. 94 Courts give Congress the highest
degree of deference in carrying out this responsibility.95
94. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 14.
95. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981) ("[J]udicial deference to such
congressional exercise of authority is at its apogee when legislative action under the
congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations for
their governance is challenged."), quoted in Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177
(1994); see also Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (deferring to
Congress in upholding the military "Don't Ask, Don't Tell' policy).
In fact, courts have held that the judiciary has the least competence to review
military regulations. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 65 ("Not only is the scope of Congress'
constitutional power in this area broad, but the lack of competence on the part of the
courts is marked."); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) ("[It is difficult to
conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less compe-
tence.").
Where judicial deference to Congress as regulator of military affairs conflicts with
judicial deference to the President as Commander in Chief, congressional interests
trump. See, e.g., Rostker, 453 U.S. at 57. In Rostker, the Court rejected an equal
protection claim by men who challenged a statute precluding draft registration of
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Judicial deference to Congress with respect to military affairs
extends to areas where the constitutional rights of individual
servicemembers are implicated.96 Although this deference does
not mean that the statute in question escapes judicial scrutiny,
or that courts are free to overlook constitutional deficiencies, an
equal protection challenge must be evaluated in the special
context of military affairs.9 7 In determining whether a constitu-
tional violation has occurred, a court must consider whether the
factors weighing in favor of the right are "so extraordinarily
weighty as to overcome the balance struck by Congress."9"
Rational Basis Review. The HIV provision is subject to the
rational basis standard of review because an HIV-positive
classification is not suspect and does not burden fundamental
rights.99 Heightened scrutiny is not applied to legislation that
women. The Court was not persuaded by the plaintiffs' argument that weight should
be given to President Carter's recommendation to Congress that women be included in
the draft registration. See id. at 60-61. Rostker, however, is distinguishable from the
HIV provision situation because in Rostker, notwithstanding his recommendation to the
contrary, President Carter accepted Congress' conclusion that women should not be
made to register, and the Department of Justice defended the statute in court. See id.
at 61.
96. See Weiss, 510 US. at 177 (" '[W]e have adhered to this principle of deference
in a variety of contexts where, as here, the constitutional rights of servicemen were
implicated.'" (quoting Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1987))); Chappell
v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (rejecting a claim for damages arising from equal
protection violations by military officials because Congress has not provided for such
a remedy); Rostker, 453 U.S. at 57 (rejecting an equal protection challenge on grounds
ofjudicial deference to Congress' decision to require only men to register for the draft).
97. See Weiss, 510 U.S. at 176-77 ("Congress, of course, is subject to the require-
ments of the Due Process Clause when legislating in the area of military affairs ....
But in determining what process is due, courts 'must give particular deference to the
determination of Congress, made under its authority to regulate the land and naval
forces.'" (citations omitted)); Rostker, 453 U.S. at 67:
None of this is to say that Congress is free to disregard the Constitution when it
acts in the area of military affairs. In that area, as any other, Congress remains
subject to the limitations of the Due Process Clause... but the tests and limita-
tions to be applied may differ because of the military context.
Id. (citations omitted); Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 927 (noting that special status of the
military means that constitutional challenges to military personnel policies face heavy
burdens).
98. Weiss, 510 US. at 177-78 (reiterating the test employed in Middendorf v.
Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 44 (1976)).
99. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996) (stating that "ifa law neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative
classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end" (citing
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993))); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985):
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makes classifications based upon disabilities,' 0 including
HIV.' O' Moreover, respect for separation of powers principles
should make courts reluctant to apply heightened scrutiny to
legislative choices and thereby establish new suspect classes.0 2
Furthermore, courts should be even more reluctant to employ
heightened scrutiny when the resulting judicial review would
be applied to the special area of military affairs.'0 3
Courts should sustain a law under rational basis review if it
can be said to advance a legitimate government interest, "even
[Wihere individuals in the group affected by a law have distinguishing charac-
teristics relevant to interests the state has the authority to implement, the courts
have been very reluctant ... to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether,
how and to what extent those interests should be pursued. In such cases, the
Equal Protection Clause requires only a rational means to serve a legitimate end.
Id. at 441-42.
To the extent that Romer provides justification for or against President Clinton's
determination that the statute was unconstitutional, it should be noted that Romer was
decided on May 20, 1996, after President Clinton decided not to defend the HIV ban.
See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1620.
100. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 321 (stating that no special standard of rational basis
review is necessary in cases of mental retardation or mental illness); see also City of
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 (holding that mental retardation is not "a quasi-suspect
classification calling for a more exacting standard of judicial review than is normally
accorded economic and social legislation").
101. See Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1267 (4th Cir.
1995) (rejecting heightened scrutiny standard of review for claim brought by HIV-
positive health care worker and stating that "[c] lassifications involving individuals with
disabilities are subject only to rational basis scrutiny"); see also Leckelt v. Board of
Comm'rs, 909 F.2d 820, 831 (5th Cir. 1990); Doe v. Marsh, No. 89-1383-OG, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1442, at *16 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 1990) ("In order to state a valid equal
protection claim, [an HIV-positive servicemember] must show that his differential
treatment on account of his HIV positive status is not rationally related to a legitimate
government interest." (citing City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440)).
Persons with HIV/AIDS are considered among the protected class of people with
disabilities for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)
(1995); see Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1994). The
military is exempt from federal disability law. See, e.g., Roper v. Department of the
Army, 832 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1987); Stinson v. Hornsby, 821 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1987);
Gonzales v. Department of the Army, 718 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1983); Marsh, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1442, at *14 (applying military exemption to reject claims brought by HIV-
positive servicemember under the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII).
102. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-42.
103. See Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 928 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (citing
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974)); see also Charles v. Rice, 28 F.3d 1312 (1st
Cir. 1994) (rejecting equal protection claim brought by HIV-positive national guardsman
challenging regulation that resulted in his discharge as unlawfully discriminating on
the basis of handicap); Marsh, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1442, at *18 (rejecting an equal
protection claim brought by an HIV-positive army enlistee challenging the policy that
prevents servicemembers with HIV from attending training programs in order to
change their area of specialty).
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if the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a
particular group, or if the rationale for it seems tenuous."'04 The
HIV provision should have been entitled to a strong presump-
tion of validity and sustained if there was "any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for
the classification." °5 Under rational basis review, no actual
legislative factfinding or empirical evidence is necessary to
sustain the statute's validity.
10 6
The discharge policy was related rationally to Congress'
legitimate goal of achieving military readiness. The HIV provi-
sion reflected a legislative conclusion that HIV-positive
servicemembers hinder military readiness because they are not
deployable. Servicemembers with HIV may be singled out from
other non-deployable servicemembers with chronic medical
conditions because of the risk of transmission of the virus and
their inability to contribute to the military blood supply.' 7
Violation of Military Law. There is a rational basis on which
to conclude that servicemembers with HIV likely contracted the
virus through drug use or same-sex sexual conduct' 8 in viola-
tion of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.' 9 Congress can set
military personnel policies to punish unsatisfactory conduct
without running afoul of the Equal Protection Clause."0
104. Roner, 116 S. Ct. at 1627; see also FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508
U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (rational basis equal protection review does not allow courts to
judge the "wisdom, fairness or logic of legislative choices").
105. Heller, 509 US. at 319-20 (quoting Beach Communications, 508 US. at 313).
106. See id., 509 US. at 320 ("'[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom
factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empir-
ical data.' " (quoting Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315)); see also Thomasson, 80
F.3d at 928 ("To sustain the validity of its policy, the government is not required to
provide empirical evidence.").
107. See Marsh, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1442, at *16 (accepting as rational the
reasons for an army policy restricting opportunities to HIV-positive servicemembers,
including safety concerns and the risk of transmission to other servicemembers.
108. See 142 CONG. REC. H8823 (daily ed. July 30, 1996) (statement of Rep. Dornan)
(noting that, according to U.S. Marine Corps officials, of the 56 marines who have
tested positive for HIV, none became infected through tainted transfusions or blood or
tissue products and concluding that transmission therefore had occurred through sex
with prostitutes, same-sex sexual conduct, and drug use); cf Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 930
(concluding that "the legislature was certainly entitled to presume that a service-
member who declares that he is gay has a propensity to engage in homosexual acts").
109. 10 U.S.C. § 912a (1994) (prohibiting drug use); id. § 925 (prohibiting sodomy);
id. § 934 (prohibiting any criminal offense).
110. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1975) ("There is nothing in the Constitu-
tion that disables a military from acting to avert what he perceives to be a clear danger
to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops on the based under his command.");
Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 929 ("No constitutional constraint prohibits the military from
preventing acts that would threaten combat capability.").
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Discriminatory Animus Not Conclusive. Even if Represen-
tative Dornan's remarks reflect a discriminatory animus toward
HIV-positive servicemembers, it does not follow necessarily that
his remarks motivated others in Congress to enact the provi-
sion.'1 ' Even if the provision was adopted out of discriminatory
animus toward servicemembers infected with HIV, that is not
a sufficient cause to invalidate the statute where other legiti-
mate, rational grounds for the ban exist."2
2. Arguments Attacking the Constitutionality of the HIV
Ban-The executive branch also could have asserted strong
arguments attacking the constitutionality of the statute as fol-
lows:
Joint Authority for Military Affairs. The Constitution assigns
the conduct of military affairs to both the legislative and execu-
tive branches." 3 Military policy choices should be evaluated
jointly by Congress and the executive branch." 4 Established
congressional practice is to develop a change in military policy
in conjunction with the executive branch." 5 In this way, restric-
tions on military personnel will reflect professional military
judgments as to which personnel contribute to military combat
effectiveness." 6 The HIV discharge provision was not developed
111. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 US. 367, 384 (1968) ("What motivates one
legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of
others to enact it .... ").
112. Cf Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226-27 (1971) (refusing to strike down
a city policy closing swimming pools despite evidence that the policy was motivated by
discriminatory animus against African-Americans because other legitimate reasons for
the policy existed); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 383 (refusing to prohibit enforcement of statute
proscribing burning of draft cards because Congress allegedly passed the law to stifle
dissent in violation of the First Amendment).
113. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (dictating that Congress regulates the armed
forces); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (dictating that the President is the Commander in Chief);
Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 924 ("The Constitution assigns the conduct of military affairs
to the Legislative and Executive branches.... [Tihe governance of military affairs is
a shared responsibility of Congress and the President.").
114. Cf Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 79 (1981) ("The fact that Congress and
the Executive have decided that women should not serve in combat fully justifies
Congress in not authorizing their registration... ."); Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 926 ("[The
imprimatur of the President, the Congress, or both imparts a degree of legitimacy to
military decisions that courts cannot hope to confer."). The Department of Justice
defended the policies at issue in Rostker and Thomasson in court after initially opposing
them at the deliberation stage. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 60-61; Thomasson, 80 F.3d at
921-22.
115. See 142 CONG. REC. S2294 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Nunn)
(criticizing Congress' lack of deliberative process with regard to the HIV ban as deviant
from the norm).
116. See Hon. Sam Nunn, The Fundamental Principles of the Supreme Court's
Jurisprudence in Military Cases, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 557, 559 (1994).
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jointly by executive branch or military officials together with
Congress." 7 The military readiness rationale was formed
without any input from the military or executive branch."'
Where a proposed change in military policy is controversial,
evaluation by both branches is even more imperative in order
to ensure acceptance of the policies within the military and
prevent societal division.'1 9
Judicial Deference Not Appropriate. With regard to military
issues, courts generally defer to congressional decisions, relying
on the joint evaluation between Congress and the executive
branch to produce appropriate legislation. 120 Such deference
assumes that military leaders have participated in the policy-
making process. 21 The ban on HIV-positive servicemembers
was not a decision that reflected any input from military lead-
ers.122 In fact, Congress did not consult with top military lead-
ers, who actually opposed the ban and viewed it as unnecessary
and unfair. 23 The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff both opposed the ban because they
believed it hindered military readiness.'24
Furthermore, judicial deference to congressional decision-
making on military legislation is warranted only if the legisla-
tion results from careful evaluation by Congress. 25 The
117. Military leaders and executive branch officials opposed the ban. See discussion
supra Part I.A.
118. See 142 CONG. REC. S2294 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Nunn).
See generally discussion supra Part I.A.
119. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 926 (stating that where opposition is likely, "the fact
that the change emanates from the political branches minimizes both the likelihood of
resistance in the military and the probability of prolonged societal division").
120. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 923 (deferring to lengthy legislative process result-
ing in a compromise policy between Congress, the executive branch, and the military
regarding gays in the military where the statute "embodies the exhaustive efforts of the
democratically accountable branches of American government and an enactment that
reflects month upon month of political negotiation and deliberation").
121. See id. at 926 ("Parallel to the deference owed Congressional and Presidential
policies is deference to the decision-making authority of military personnel who 'have
been charged by the Executive and Legislative Branches with carrying out our Nation's
military policy.'" (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508 (1986))); see also
Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507 ("[C]ourts must give great deference to the professional
judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular
military interest."); A Law Not Worth Defending, ROCKY MTN. NEws, Feb. 14, 1996, at
47A ("The Supreme Court gives wide berth to the military to set its own rules.").
122. See discussion supra Part I.A.
123. See DOD/Joint Chiefs Statement, supra note 8.
124. See Letter from William Perry, Secretary of Defense, to Representative Thomas
A. Daschle, supra note 21; see also DOD/Joint Chiefs Statement, supra note 8.
125. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 US. 57, 71-72 (1981) (deferring to Congress
where extensive consideration in hearings, during floor debate, and in committee made
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attitudes expressed by Representative Dornan, and the absence
of alternative explanations in the record, as well as the lack of
hearings, debate, committee discussion, and the failure to
obtain input from the executive branch and military leaders 26
all belie any suggestion that Congress acted with requisite care.
While courts have tended to provide more limited review of
Congress' determination of military personnel policies because
of Congress' constitutional authority in this area,'27 the special
military context does not allow Congress "to disregard the
Constitution when it acts in the area of military affairs." 2 '
Judicial deference requires consideration of the constitutional
rights at stake.129 Typically, Congress "carefully assesses the
military necessity for any difference in treatment, and gives
careful consideration to a wide range of views."3 ° Where Con-
gress has not given due consideration to the constitutional
problems of a particular piece of legislation and has approved
it without full awareness of those problems, the President's
obligation to defend it is mitigated.' 3 ' The interests of national
security implicit in the goal of military readiness should not be
allowed to weaken domestic security.'32
it "apparent that Congress was fully aware not merely of the many facts and figures
presented to it by witnesses who testified before its Committees, but of the current
thinking as to the place of [the affected group) in the Armed Services"); see also Weiss
v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) ("'Congress has primary responsibility for
the delicate task of balancing the rights of servicemen against the needs of the
military.'" (quoting Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447 (1987))); Thomasson, 80
F.3d at 925 ("'Congress, working with the Executive Branch, has developed a system
of military... law that carefully balances the rights of individual servicemembers and
the needs of the armed forces.'" (quoting Nunn, supra note 116, at 566)).
126. See discussion supra Part I.A.
127. See US. CONST. art I, § 8; Solorio, 483 U.S. at 447-48; Rostker, 453 US. at
68-70; Middendorfv. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 43 (1976).
128. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 67; see also Nunn, supra note 116, at 565 (noting that
members of Congress are mindful of their duty to consider the constitutional rights of
servicemembers when dealing with military affairs).
129. See Rostker, 453 US. at 64 ("The customary deference accorded the judgments
of Congress is certainly appropriate when, as here, Congress specifically considered the
question of the Act's constitutionality."); Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 945 (Luttig, J.,
concurring) (stating that congressional "commands" should not be interfered with by
"unelected officials" where Congress "explicitly considered, at length, the constitutional
validity of its action").
130. Nunn, supra note 116, at 565 n.32 (noting as an example of this typical
behavior the careful process used by Congress in developing the "Don't Ask Don't Tell"
policy on gays and lesbians in the military).
131. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The President's Power of Interpretation: Implications of
a Unified Theory of Constitutional Law, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35, 59 (1993).
132. See United States v. Robel, 389 US. 258, 264 (1967) ("It would indeed be ironic
if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those
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Heightened Scrutiny Appropriate. The HIV provision should
be subject to a heightened level of scrutiny. First, while courts
generally have held that classifications based on disability
should receive only rational basis review, 133 the passage of the
Americans with Disabilities Act 34 (ADA) reflects an attempt by
Congress to mandate a higher level of scrutiny for classifica-
tions based on disability.'35 Since the ADA's passage in 1990,136
the Supreme Court has not addressed the question of whether
persons with disabilities now constitute a suspect class.
13 7
Several lower courts have used the ADA as a guide to interpret-
ing federal and state law, however, and have determined that
persons with disabilities are entitled to special constitutional
protection.13
8
liberties... which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile."); Thomasson, 80 F.3d
at 949 (Hall, J., dissenting) ("Aside from cheapening our national values, a broad
'military exception' from the Constitution in the interest of defending us from foreign
danger could transform the military into a domestic danger.").
133. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 US. 432, 446 (1985);
Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1267 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Clas-
sifications involving individuals with disabilities are subject only to rational basis
scrutiny."); Spragens v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 947, 950 (10th Cir. 1994) (applying a rational
basis standard to a classification involving blind persons), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1399
(1995); Association of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1001 (3d Cir. 1993)
(stating that rational basis is the correct standard of review for a classification of
business owners with disabilities and that the ADA did not overrule City of Cleburne),
cert. denied, No. 96-899, 1996 WL 723348 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1997).
The Supreme Court has not addressed yet an equal protection claim in the context
of HIV discrimination. The Court has stated that Congress should be granted greater
deference where it has legislated on behalf of persons with mental retardation because
retardation presents a range of "difficult" and "technical" matters that the legislature
is most qualified to address. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-43. Yet, the same
may not be true for other disabilities. See Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation,
Morality and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. Prff. L. REV. 237, 259-76 (1996)
(questioning City of Cleburne's application in subsequent decisions, which would require
rational basis review for all disabilities). One could argue that the barriers to opportuni-
ty, which are bolstered by conscious and unconscious stereotypes, should be eradicated
for people with disabilities just as for women and racial minorities. See, e.g., Chai R.
Feldblum, Antidiscrimination Requirement of the ADA, in IMPLEMENTING THE AMERI-
cANs wrrH DIsABnmrIEs ACT 35 (Lawrence 0. Gostin et al. eds., 1993).
134. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (1994).
135. See Lisa A. Montanaro, Comment, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Will the
Court Get the Hint? Congress'Attempt to Raise the Status of Persons with Disabilities
in Equal Protection Cases, 15 PACE L. REv. 621, 647-52 (1995) (discussing cases in
which federal courts have used the ADA as a means for holding that the disabled are
entitled to "special protection or solace from the courts").
136. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
137. The Court denied certiorari in January 1994, in a case that presented the issue
of whether mentally ill persons, a subgroup of the disabled, are a suspect class. See
Ibarra v. Duc Van Le, 114 S. Ct. 918 (1994); see also Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319
(1993) (declining to address the issue of whether mentally retarded persons constitute
a quasi-suspect class because the issue was not presented to any of the lower courts).
138. See, e.g., Trautz v. Weisman, 819 F. Supp. 282, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding
that prior case, law that concluded that disabled persons do not constitute a suspect
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Second, heightened scrutiny is particularly appropriate
where, as here, a statute removes protection formerly enjoyed
by the affected group. Until the ban was passed, military law
prohibited adverse employment actions against servicemembers
on the basis of their HIV-positive status.139
Rational Basis Review Fails. Even if the HIV provision is
subject to rational basis review, recent Supreme Court case law
reaffirms that this lowest level of scrutiny has real "teeth."14 ° A
class because they have not suffered a history of discrimination is undercut by the
ADA); People v. Green, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130, 132-33 (Westchester County Ct. 1990)
(employing rational basis review to invalidate the use of peremptory challenges against
a deaf person and noting that disabled persons could constitute a suspect classification
entitled to strict scrutiny under New York disability law and evaluating that law's
protection against the background of the ADA); see also Montanaro, supra note 135, at
621.
139. See 10 U.S.C. § 1074 note (1988) (Restriction on Use of Information Obtained
During Certain Epidemiologic-Assessment Interviews) ("Information obtained by the
Department of Defense during or as a result of an epidemiologic-assessment interview
with a serum-positive member of the Armed Forces may not be used to support any
adverse personnel action against the member.").
The HIV ban also could present a violation of federal disability law. See, e.g.,
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,29 U.S.C. § 791 (Supp. 1996) (federal government equivalent
to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2) (1995), which generally
protects persons with HIV from loss of employment); Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1994); cf. Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1321
(E.D. Pa. 1994). Although most courts have held that the military is exempt from
federal anti-discrimination law, see, e.g., Doe v. Marsh, No. 89-1383-OG, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1442, at *14 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 1990) (applying military exemption to reject claims
brought by HIV-positive servicemember under the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII); see
also Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1990); Roper v. Department of the Army,
832 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1987); Stinson v. Hornsby, 821 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1987);
Gonzalez v. Department of the Army, 718 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1983), some have noted
that this exemption has no basis in law, see, e.g., Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228,
1238 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (concluding that "members of the armed forces are federal
employees who share in all Americans' constitutional right to equal protection under
the law. There is nothing in Title VII to suggest that the uniformed military are an
exception to 'members of military departments' expressly covered under § 2000e-16.").
Without a military exemption, HIV-positive servicemembers would be protected from
discrimination on the basis of disability under the Rehabilitation Act. See Doe v.
Centinela, No. 97 Civ. 22514 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 1988) (holding that discrimination
based solely on fear of contagion of HIV is discrimination based on handicap for
purposes of the Rehabilitation Act); Op. Off. Legal Counsel (Sept. 27, 1988) (holding
that person who tests positive for HIV is "handicapped" within the meaning of section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
140. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (employing rational basis review
to invalidate an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that would have barred all
legislative, executive, or judicial action protecting gay men and lesbians from discrimi-
nation). Prior Supreme Court decisions have also invalidated legislation on rational
basis review. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
446-50 (1985).
As discussed supra note 99, Romer was decided after the Clinton Administration
decided not to defend the HIV ban, and therefore the Administration did not use Romer
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law that classifies a particular group must be "narrow enough
in scope and grounded in a sufficient factual context for [a
court] to ascertain that there existed some relation between the
classification and the purpose it served."' The HIV provision
did not meet this standard. There is almost no factual context
from which a court could determine that the provision served
the end of military readiness.4 2 In fact, the legislative history
of the HIV provision indicates an overwhelming belief that the
ban did not promote military readiness, but rather, hindered
it.' Both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that discharges were "unwarranted
and unwise," "unnecessary as a matter of sound military poli-
cy," and "would waste the government's investment in the
training of these individuals and be disruptive to military
programs in which they play an integral role."' In addition,
Congress did not explain how the unavailability of a small
group of HIV-positive servicemembers for overseas deployment
hindered military readiness 45 and offered no rationale for
singling out servicemembers with HIV from the larger group of
personnel on restricted deployment because of other chronic
medical conditions. 46
Moreover, there is no rational reason for the ban that a court
could postulate on Congress' behalf.147 A rationale justifying the
separation of HIV-positive personnel because of fear of trans-
mission of the virus141 is impermissible because it reflects a
as justification for its decision. A court evaluating the ban in a subsequent challenge,
however, would likely have turned to Romer for guidance.
141. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
142. See discussion supra Part I.
143. See id.
144. DOD/Joint Chiefs Statement, supra note 8.
145. See discussion supra Part I.A.
146. See id. Senator Sam Nunn concluded, "There is not a clearly articulated
legislative basis for treating HIV-positive personnel in a manner that differs from the
treatment of other nondeployables." 142 CONG. REC. S2294 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Nunn). The absence of careful legislative consideration that normally
accompanies changes in military personnel policy strikes a fatal blow against the HIV
provision's survival of a constitutional challenge. See id.
147. Under rational basis review, the government has no obligation to produce
evidence to sustain a statute's validity; rather, any possible rational speculation will
provide justification. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993). Nonetheless, "even the
standard of rationality as we so often have defined it must find some footing in the
realities of the subject addressed by the legislation." Id. at 321.
148. See 139 CONG. REC. H7081 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Dornan) ("[Elvery military unit is a walking blood bank.... We simply cannot risk
polluting the blood supply by allowing practicing homosexuals in the military.").
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misunderstanding of the risks of transmission. 4 9 Congress'
proferred justification for legislation cannot be an "accidental
byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about [the affected
group]." 15 Representative Dornan's assertion that service-
members contracted HIV through practices that violate the
Uniform Code of Military Justice ignores well-established
medical knowledge that HIV is often transmitted through blood
transfusions or heterosexual conduct, acts that do not constitute
military misconduct. Fifty percent of servicemembers with HIV
have spouses of the opposite sex infected with the virus, 5 '
suggesting that transmission could have occurred through
spousal contact 5 2 and that the spouse may have contracted the
virus first.
Punishment on Account of Status. Even if it can be estab-
lished that most servicemembers contracted the virus through
misconduct, singling out HIV-positive servicemembers for
discharge impermissibly punishes them on account of their
HIV-positive status. 5 3 Conduct such as intravenous drug use,
gay sex, or sex with prostitutes, which the military may choose
to punish, must be distinguished from the "status" of being
HIV-positive, which the military may not punish.'54
149. See, e.g., Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that a
military policy preventing gays and lesbians from serving in the armed forces could not
be justified rationally based on evidence of increased risk of HIV infection from same-
sex sexual activity, and stating that it is impermissible to assume that gay persons
would break rules by engaging in such activity, much less that they are HIV positive);
cf Unfair Ban on H1V in Uniform, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 12, 1996, at A16, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (asserting that the HIV ban is "a throwback to more
fearful days when the difficulty of transmitting the virus was less widely understood").
150. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 74 (1981) (rejecting equal protection
claim where Congress' decision to exclude women from draft "was not the 'accidental
byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females'" (citations omitted)). The
rationale offered by Representative Dornan certainly constitutes an unfortunate
byproduct of societal notions about HV-positive individuals.
151. See Clinton Won't Defend HIV Law; Repeal Proposed, supra note 8, at 10
(noting Defense Department data that one-half of HIV-positive servicemembers are
married).
152. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 39, at A3 (interviewing HIV-positive Army Sergeant
who contracted the virus from her husband).
153. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (overturning conviction of
an individual for his drug addiction because it made "the 'status' of narcotic addiction
a criminal offense," constituting cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); see also Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532-34
(1968) (affirming the Robinson reasoning that status and activity can be distinguished
even when the defining characteristic of the status is to engage in a particular activity).
154: See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660; Powell, 392 U.S. at 514. In Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Court held that sodomy is not a fundamental right and may
be criminalized, but explicitly refused to consider any implicated equal protection issue.
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Congress did not establish that there was a military need to
discharge all HIV-positive servicemembers to maintain order.155
The military already has administrative and judicial procedures
in place to discipline those involved in misconduct. Further-
more, punishment on account of HIV-positive status would be
overinclusive because not all persons who contracted the virus
did so through misconduct.'56 The provision does not make
exceptions for persons who contracted HIV through a "legiti-
mate" transmission. 15 7 Such persons must be allowed to rebut
the presumption that they engaged in misconduct.' 58
Finally, while Congress may be legitimately hostile to persons
convicted of crimes, it did not limit the HIN provision to persons
convicted, or even accused, of violations of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice.'59 To penalize them as if they had engaged in
"misconduct," without a hearing or other administrative or
judicial procedures, may present due process concerns. HIV
infection would operate as a per se determination that the virus
was contracted through a violation of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. 6 °
Discriminatory Motive. A classification violates the Equal
Protection Clause where furthering an impermissible purpose
was a motivating factor for establishing the classification. (It
See id. at 196 n.8; Mark Strasser, Unconstitutional? Don't Ask; If It Is, Don't Tell: On
Deference, Rationality, and the Constitution, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 375, 403 n.162 (1995).
The rejection of an anti-gay rights law in Romer lends recent support to the idea that
the "status" of homosexuality may not be penalized. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct.
1620, 1629 (1996).
155. For an assertion of these arguments, see Senator Nunn's statements in 142
CONG. REc. 82294 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996).
156. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 39, at A3 (describing the difficulties faced by an
HIV-positive servicemember who contracted the virus from her husband).
157. It may be that no reason is legitimate enough for the proponents of the ban.
See id. (regarding an Army Sergeant who contracted HIV from her husband, Represen-
tative Dornan remarked that "she obviously had unprotected sex with someone whose
entire background she didn't know.... She should be a good patriot and take her
honorable discharge.").
158. In the context of the ban on gays and lesbians in the military, servicemembers
have been allowed to rebut the presumption that they have the "propensity" to engage
in same-sex sexual conduct forbidden under military law. See Richenberg v. Perry, 909
F. Supp. 1303, 1313 (D. Neb.), affd, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1995); Able v. United States,
880 F. Supp. 968, 976 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996).
159. In fact, under the provision, servicemembers would have received honorable
discharges. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-106, § 567(a)(1)(b), 110 Stat. 186, 328 (amending 10 U.S.C. § 1177 (1994)).
160. Cf Richenberg, 909 F. Supp. at 1313 (rejecting a due process claim where a
servicemember facing a presumption of a propensity to engage in same-sex sexual
conduct is afforded a full hearing and an opportunity to rebut that presumption).
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need not be the only motivating factor.) Prejudice against a
particular class of persons may not be either a direct or an
indirect motivating factor for creating a law. 161 Representative
Dornan's remarks provide sufficient evidence that the HIV
provision was motivated by prejudice, at least in part, against
persons with HIV. 6 2 Legislation motivated by a desire to harm
a politically unpopular group does not further a legitimate
governmental purpose. 63
D. A President May Decline to Defend
"Probably" Unconstitutional Legislation
Although the Clinton Administration maintained that its
chances for overturning the HIV ban on constitutional grounds
were good,' 6' the discussion in Part II.C reveals that a court
arguably could have held the statute constitutional. The HIV
provision was not "patently" unconstitutional as that standard
traditionally has been understood.'65 Moreover, it cannot be
posited that no "reasonable" argument in support of the HIV
ban's constitutionality existed. 6 6 President Clinton's decision
reflects an emerging lower standard for presidential determina-
tions that legislation is unconstitutional and therefore not
worthy of defense: the executive branch may decline to defend
a statute in situations where it determines that the statute is
"probably" unconstitutional. There need not be an existing court
decision on the constitutional issue or arguments supporting
only one side of the dispute. 67 Under these circumstances, what
legislation will be deemed "probably" unconstitutional becomes
161. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
162. See discussion supra Part I.A.
163. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996) ("[I]f the constitutional
conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest." (quoting Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973))); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47
(1985).
164. See Quinn/Dellinger Briefing, supra note 35, at 7; Clinton Won't Defend HIV
Law; Repeal Proposed, supra note 8, at 1.
165. See supra note 69 and accompanying text
166. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
167. The HIV ban is not subject to the "foreclosed as litigable" standard articulated
in Simkins. See Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); see also discussion supra Part II.B.
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a question of leadership: the executive branch must conduct its
own constitutional evaluation and determine which position is
most "respectable." Such evaluations appropriately may reflect
a President's policy or political agenda.'68 President Clinton's
position that the statute was unconstitutional not only took into
account judicial precedent but also served a policy goal of sup-
porting HIV-positive troops as valuable members of the mili-
tary69 and a political agenda of catering to widespread public
opposition to the ban. 7 '
III. IS A Low THRESHOLD APPROPRIATE AS
A MATTER OF POLICY?
Central to the determination of whether President Clinton's
decision not to defend the HIV provision was correct as a
matter of policy is the vision we have of our democratic institu-
tions. If we believe that the legislature is the best governmental
body to refine and enlarge the views of the population at
large, 7' we might reject the President's decision not to defend
legislation as an attempt to contravene the public will. Con-
versely, if we suspect that the legislature may not always be
able to distill the will of its constituents correctly, or to uphold
certain fundamental rights, especially those affecting minority
168. Commentators have recognized similar standards for executive branch
constitutional interpretation in the context of Attorney General opinion writing. See
McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function, supra note 68, at 375. One model of
Attorney General legal interpretations-akin to the "no respectable argument" standard
for decisions not to defend legislation-allows a President to interpret the law indepen-
dently of Supreme Court precedent. See id. at 389-400 (describing an "Independent
Authority" model of presidential legal interpretation). In another model, which
incorporates the political or policy aspects considered in a decision to decline to defend
legislation, the President "simply interprets the law to advance his political objectives,
taking into account precedent or legal principles only to the extent that they may create
a political obstacle to fulfilling those objectives." Id. at 381 & n.18 (describing an
"Institutional" model and noting that this model is most common in actual practice).
President Clinton's decision not to defend the HIV provision reflects both the "Indepen-
dent Authority" and "Institutional" models of presidential legal interpretation, as well
as a "Court-Centered" model, which exclusively looks to and relies upon judicial
precedent for guidance on the constitutional issue. See id. at 382-89.
169. See discussion supra Part I.B.
170. See discussion supra Part I.C.
171. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (noting that the effect
of representative government is "to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing
them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern
the true interest of their country").
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groups, we might support more flexible structures and relation-
ships of representation, with increased reliance upon the execu-
tive and the judiciary.'72
In order to determine whether a lower standard with respect
to presidential non-defense of legislation is proper as a matter
of policy, we must consider the appropriate role of the President
in furthering the purposes and goals of democracy. We must
evaluate whether a presidential decision not to defend legisla-
tion leaves the executive branch unaccountable for its'action,
thereby thwarting the purpose of representative government, or
merely protects the interests of minority groups who are effec-
tively excluded from the political process.
Our view as to whether the HIV ban was unconstitutional
also affects the analysis. If we believe individual constitutional
rights were infringed, then the political process did not work,
and our democratic institutions have failed, providing further
support for President Clinton's decision to step in to cure the
defect.
This Part looks at considerations that legitimize President
Clinton's decision regardless of whether support for it is found
within the plain language of the Constitution or in legal prece-
dent. This Part argues that the grounds on which a President
may support his decision not to defend do not enlarge his
authority inordinately nor undermine the role and function of
the legislative or judicial branches.
This Part addresses these broad political questions through
a discussion of considerations raised by a presidential decision
not to defend legislation. Through this analysis, this Part
concludes that it makes sense to support a standard that allows
the President to decline to defend "probably" unconstitutional
legislation where Congress has failed to deliberate over the
constitutional issue, the provision is attached to massive, badly
needed funding legislation rendering a presidential veto imprac-
tical, and the President determines that it is not respectable to
support Congress' position. This standard is consistent with
constitutional separation of powers principles and ensures that
non-defense is appropriate as an executive branch prerogative.
172. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
609 (1969) (asserting that the separation of powers was intended primarily to protect
individual rights from encroachments by the legislature); see also THE FEDERALIST No.
48 (James Madison) ("The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere
of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.").
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A. Concerns Regarding Non-Defense
As the quick repeal of the HIV provision suggests, the Presi-
dent's decision not to defend legislation may have substantial
impact on federal law. Consequently, applying a lower threshold
to the President's determination that enacted legislation is
unconstitutional and therefore should not be defended raises a
number of concerns. 1
73
Most significantly, affording the President the discretion to
withhold the defense of a statute could jeopardize the equilib-
rium established by the separation of powers required by the
Constitution. 74 Specifically, the exercise of this discretion may
shift substantially authority over the practical content of federal
law from the legislative to the executive branch. First, presiden-
tial discretion to decline to defend legislation would render
congressional lawmaking less certain. 7 5 The influence of the
executive branch would be increased both in the drafting and
the passage of legislation.'76 Second, as the President selectively
declines to defend statutes, the resulting federal laws would
reflect his policy preferences and diminish those of Congress. 1
77
Third, by declining to defend a legislative provision, the Presi-
dent would accomplish indirectly what the Constitution would
not allow him to do directly: the invalidation of specific statutory
provisions after their enactment or the exercise of a line-item
173. On the whole, commentators have been critical of a President's ability to decline
to execute statutes. See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS,
1787-1984, at 72 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that the President must promote enforcement
of a statute of questionable constitutionality by all powers constitutionally at his disposal
unless and until enforcement is prevented by regular judicial process); Miller &
Bowman, supra note 82, at 72 ("T]he presidential obligation faithfully to execute the
laws does not give the Chief Executive a selective item veto over the laws he is to
execute."); Note, supra note 52, at 971.
174. See 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55, 56 (1980); Note, supra note 52, at 976-79.
175. Press accounts of President Clinton's decision not to defend the HIV provision
supported the existence of such uncertainty, reporting that President Clinton could not
accept the HIV provision as final even as he signed it into law. See, e.g., Clinton Signs
Defense Bill, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 10, 1996, available in LEXIS News Library,
Curnws File. See generally Note, supra note 52, at 979 (asserting that presidential non-
defense of legislation renders congressional lawmaking less certain).
176. Congress would be forced to present the President with legislation that would
pass his review on two levels: first, to avoid veto, and second, to be ensured defense. See
Note, supra note 52, at 979 n.28.
177. Cf Metzenbaum v. Brown, 448 F. Supp. 538, 542 (D.D.C. 1978) (stating that
a pocket veto would "increase the power of the President over the enactment of bills of
Congress into law [and] would diminish the power of Congress to make laws").
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veto without a congressional opportunity to override it. 7 8 In
effect, the President would exercise the power of repeal, which
the Constitution reserves for Congress. 179 Finally, presidential
non-defense would promote administrative lawmaking by allow-
ing the President to attempt to achieve through executive
authority what he has been unable to achieve through negotia-
tions with Congress. 80 A decision not to defend could also
intrude upon the constitutional power of the judiciary to deter-
mine the validity of congressional legislation.' 8 '
B. How Those Concerns Are Alleviated
A number of arguments alleviate the concerns raised by
presidential authority to decline to defend legislation. These
178. See EASTLAND, supra note 61, at 76 (stating that consistent with the Constitu-
tion, a President "should not reach into a bill presented to him and attempt to veto some
part of it. The Presentment Clause ... does not contain a so-called 'item veto.' "); Note,
supra note 52, at 971 n.2.
The Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996), has raised con-
stitutional concerns similar to those presented by presidential non-defense of legislation.
This Act, which went into effect on January 1, 1997, allows a President to veto, or
"cancel," specific dollar spending amounts contained in appropriations or certain other
direct spending bills. See id. § 1021, 110 Stat. at 1200-01. Congress, however, retains
the opportunity to override, or "disapprove," of the item vetoed by the President. See id.
§§ 1021, 1026, 110 Stat. at 1200-01, 1207-10. Several members of Congress have already
challenged the Line Item Veto Act as an unconstitutional interference with Congress'
legislating authority. See Toni Locy, Six Lawmakers Challenge Constitutionality of Line-
Item Veto for President, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1997, at A20.
179. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; Note, supra note 52, at 971 n.2.
180. See Cornell W. Clayton, Introduction: Politics and the Legal Bureaucracy, in
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS: THE FEDERAL LEGAL BUREAUCRACY AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS,
supra note 61, at 9 ("[Plresidents, faced with increasingly hostile Congresses (usually
controlled by the opposing party), began to rely heavily on administrative rather than
legislative strategies of policy-making. . . ."). President Clinton's response to the HIV
provision was designed clearly to achieve administratively what the executive branch
was not able to achieve in its fight with Congress over the ban. This strategy was
apparent to the news media, see, e.g., ABC World News Saturday (ABC television
broadcast, Jan. 27, 1996), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File ("[Tihe
administration hopes ... to figure out ways to get round the discharge provision before
it becomes effective."), and was reflected in both the decision not to defend and in the
commitment to ensure full benefits to affected servicemembers.
181. See US. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 11, 15 (1937) ("Should
the Attorney General now vouchsafe his opinion holding the legislation unconstitutional,
he would set himself up as a judge of the acts of Congress and of the President"); 4A
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55, 60 (1980). But cf Gavett v. Alexander, 477 F. Supp. 1033,
1044 (D.D.C. 1979) (noting that a constitutional determination by the executive branch,
although not binding upon courts, is entitled to significant weight).
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arguments suggest that a lower threshold for presidential non-
defense actually promotes traditional principles of democracy.
1. Adequate Representation Ensured for Congress-Perhaps
most importantly, executive branch non-defense of legislation
does not leave congressional interests unprotected if the legisla-
tion is challenged in court. When the executive branch makes
a decision not to defend a statute, Congress has an independent
means of defending the legislation's validity. In 1978, Congress
created an institutionalized alternative to Department of Justice
legal representation."8 2 The Senate Legal Counsel's Office and
the Counsel to the Clerk of the House of Representatives now
regularly intervene in judicial proceedings to represent Congress
or its interests when the Department of Justice refuses."8 3
Congress also may hire private legal counsel." As a result,
Congress' interests are protected without having to resort to
direct challenges to the President's authority to decline to defend
statutes. 8 5 In fact, a court likely would refuse to recognize that
Congress' authority had been injured if Congress declined to
undertake the legislation's defense itself.'86
182. See Ethics and Government Act of 1978, 2 U.S.C. § 288 (1994) (establishing the
Office of Senate Legal Counsel). This statute authorizes the Senate Legal Counsel to
intervene or appear, when authorized by the Senate, in any legal action "in which the
powers and responsibilities of Congress under the Constitution of the United States are
placed in issue." Id. § 288e(a).
The introduction of independent congressional litigating authority coincides with
increased instances of executive branch non-defense. Prior to the creation of the Senate
Legal Counsel, Justice Department refusals to defend Congress and its statutes were
rare. See discussion supra Part II.B. It may be that the presence of this legislation has
given the executive branch more flexibility to decide to decline to defend legislation it
finds offensive. It may also be that in the post-Watergate era, the two branches have
redefined their relationship to some extent, with Congress seeking more protection
from a Justice Department that does not appear professionally independent from the
President.
183. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 US. 547 (1990); INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983); League of Women Voters v. FCC, 489 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
184. See PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER
409 (1988).
185. Courts have adopted such a view where executive action that arguably exceeds
its authority is reviewable through the existence of other possible plaintiffs. See Riegle
v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 881-82 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1082 (1981).
186. Courts have required that in order for Congress to be "injured" for purposes of
standing, it must have exhausted all possible remedies. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444
U.S. 996, 997-98 (1979) (stating that a dispute between the legislative and political
branches is not ripe for judicial review until these political branches reach a constitu-
tional impasse); see also Note, supra note 52, at 981 n.39 (noting that a court would
likely recognize that any party with standing to seek a writ of mandamus would have
standing to defend the statute and that a court would not be likely to recognize that an
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In contrast, where a President refuses to enforce, as opposed
to defend legislation passed by Congress, he interferes more
significantly with the interests of the legislative branch. Con-
gress possesses no means through which it may implement
legislation; that function falls exclusively within the sphere of
executive branch authority. 8 7 For this reason, it makes sense
to require a higher threshold of unconstitutionality when a
President declines to enforce legislation. He only should be
permitted to decline to enforce Congress' mandate in situations
where the legislation is "patently" unconstitutional.' 8
2. Adequate Notice and Accountability-Although no statu-
tory provision requires it, modern Presidents announce their
opinions on the constitutionality of legislation in their signing
statements. 189 In such a statement, President Clinton announced
his decision not to defend the HIV provision because he believed
it was unconstitutional, thereby ensuring his immediate public
accountability.'9" This announcement prompted Congress to
injury exists for purpose of the writ if the party seeking it refused to defend the statute
itself).
187. See US. CONST. art. II, § 3 (stating that the President shall take care that laws
are faithfully executed). In fact, courts may tend to come down hard on Congress when
it moves outside the legislative sphere into the executive one. See, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S.
at 954-55 (refusing to allow Congress to interfere with authority delegated to the
executive branch). As we have seen, courts do not tend to react as strongly to presiden-
tial non-defense, which arguably moves outside of the executive sphere and interferes
with the legislative one. See discussion supra Part II.B.
188. See discussion supra Part II.B.
189. See The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements, Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 4 (Nov. 3, 1993); EASTLAND, supra note 61, at 73-75; cf generally Marc N.
Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretations of
Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363
(1987) (arguing that courts should ignore presidential signing statements when attempt-
ing to discern congressional intent).
The executive branch usually does not inform Congress when it is considering
declining to defend a statute. See Congressional Interest Hearings, supra note 69, at 86
(supplemental statement of Rex Lee, Assistant Attorney General) ("It is not the practice
of the Department of Justice to consult with Congress in determining whether to defend
a statute, nor does it consult with Congress in determining whether to appeal an adverse
constitutional holding.").
190. See Signing Statement, supra note 4, at 261 ("In accordance with my consti-
tutional determination, the Attorney General will decline to defend this provision.
Instead, the Attorney General will inform the House and Senate of this determination
so that they may, if they wish, present to the courts their argument that the provision
should be sustained.").
Beginning with the Reagan Administration, Presidents increasingly have used signing
statements as a tool for advancing a legal strategy. See Nelson Lund, Guardians of the
Presidency: The Office of the Counsel to the President and the Office of Legal Counsel,
in GOVERNMENT LAWYERS: THE FEDERAL LEGAL BUREAUCRACY AND PRESIDENTIAL
POLITICS, supra note 61, at 221; Frank B. Cross, The Constitutional Legitimacy and
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request from the Justice Department an explanation of the
executive branch authority for the decision to decline to defend
the provision. 9' The explanation was provided promptly.'92
In the absence of such early initiative by the President,
federal law requires the Solicitor General to notify Congress in
the event that the executive branch chooses not to defend the
constitutionality of a statute at the appellate level.'93 Congress
has authorized the President to decline to defend legislation at
the appellate stage as long as he provides notification to Con-
gress. In this instance, because the President is acting in accord
Significance of Presidential "Signing Statements4"40ADMIN. L. REV. 209,210-11(1988)
(indicating that the practice dates back to President Andrew Jackson, but was formalized
and popularized by President Ronald Reagan).
A signing statement may help effect a legal strategy in several ways. The statement
may be used to instruct executive branch agencies on how to interpret or administer
the law or to direct them to resolve statutory ambiguities in a way favored by the
President. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 27 WEEKLY
CoMP. PREs. DOC. 1701 (Nov. 21, 1991). See generally Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 1-2
(Nov. 3, 1993).
The statement may interpret the statute and hope that courts will rely on the
interpretation as a legitimate form of legislative history. See id. at 6. This use has been
criticized as an inappropriate means of resolving politically sensitive issues or disputes
with Congress, or as an improper effort to interpret away unconstitutional provisions,
and as an undermining of statutory structure as well as constitutional separation of
powers. See, e.g., Garber & Wimmer, supra note 189, at 363; William D. Popkin, Judicial
Use of Presidential Legislative History: A Critique, 66 IND. L.J. 699, 709-17 (1991). In
addition, courts may give little weight to such interpretations by a President. See Cross,
supra, at 234-35; Popkin, supra, at 702-03 and nn.14 & 17.
A signing statement may also inform Congress and the public of the President's
opinion that a particular provision is unconstitutional or that he will not enforce or
defend it. See Op. Off. Legal Counsel 4 (Nov. 3, 1993). This use creates a record that can
be used later to refute claims that the President has approved of constitutionally dubious
provisions of bills that he has decided to sign because of his desire to see other
provisions of the legislation become law. See, e.g., Robert H. Jackson, A Presidential
Legal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1353, 1357-68 (1953) (citing President Roosevelt's mem-
orandum to his Attorney General in which he went on record about a Land-Lease Act
provision's unconstitutionality so that his signing would "not be construed as a tacit
acquiescence" in the provision and to prevent "his action in approving the bill which
include[d) this invalid clause" from being "used as a precedent for any future legislation
comprising provisions of a similar nature").
President Clinton's statement at the signing of the Act reflects each of these
strategies. See Signing Statement, supra note 4, at 261.
191. See Letter from Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, to Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S.
Department of Justice (Feb. 21, 1996) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform).
192. See Letter from Assistant Attorney General Andrew Fois to Senator Orrin G.
Hatch, supra note 30.
193. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978,2 US.C. § 288K(b) (1994); see also Gavett
v. Alexander, 477 F. Supp. 1035, 1043-44 (D.D.C. 1979) (discussing executive branch
notification to Congress, as required by statute, when it refuses to defend legislation).
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with congressional legislation, presidential authority is at its
maximum and is afforded wide judicial deference.'94 The wide
berth given to presidential authority in these circumstances can
be extended reasonably to decisions not to defend statutes at the
trial stage where, as with the HIV provision non-defense deci-
sion, notification is provided to Congress. 19
3. Check on the Legislature-Because the Constitution places
limits on what the legislative branch lawfully may do, it makes
sense to allow the President discretionary authority regarding
execution of the acts of Congress. 196 Such authority serves as a
check on the legislature where it passes legislation in violation
of the Constitution. If the President were compelled to defend
statutes that he believes to be unconstitutional, the end effect
could be the legislature's usurpation of executive power.'97
4. Judicial Resolution Available-A presidential decision to
decline defending legislation forces resolution of the dispute in
the judiciary, the branch best equipped to handle it. 98 While the
President's constitutional determination may be given some
weight by the courts,' 99 ultimately the judiciary will decide the
constitutional question and serve as a check on the President
should he overstep his authority.
5. Lack of Clear Guidelines-The underlying rationale for
executive branch deference to congressional legislation is that,
in most cases, the judiciary can be relied upon to invalidate
194. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that presidential authority is at its maximum when
the President's acts are authorized by Congress).
195. Because the Justice Department possesses complete discretion to appeal
decisions finding statutes unconstitutional, declining to defend legislation at the trial
level could be characterized as an exercise of that same discretion. See Note, supra note
52, at 977 n.27. One could argue, however, that at the appellate level, the judiciary has
been involved previously, meaningfully distinguishing this discretion to decline to defend
legislation exercised at the trial stage.
196. See 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55, 58 (1980); see also Op. Off. Legal Counsel 4
n.8 (Nov. 3, 1993) (noting that because the legislature possibly may transgress the
bounds assigned to it, and the judiciary may pronounce the legislature's conduct void,
the President, by analogy, should not execute unconstitutional laws (paraphrasing
constitutional framer James Wilson)).
197. See 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55, 57 (1980).
198. See League of Women Voters v. FCC, 489 F. Supp. 517, 521 (C.D. Cal. 1980)
("mhis suit is flavored by a sub silentio prayer by the Executive branch for action by
the Judicial branch that it cannot take itself."); see also Gavett, 477 F. Supp. at 1044
("[Uit is the function of the courts ultimately to determine the constitutionality of federal
actions and laws." (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803))).
199. Cf Gavett, 477 F. Supp. at 1044 (noting that while determination by the
executive branch that a statute is unconstitutional is not binding on the court "it con-
stitutes a significant circumstance which should be accorded some weight").
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unconstitutional laws.200 A lack of Supreme Court resolution of
many constitutional issues, however, including the equal protec-
tion issues raised by the HIV ban,201 may explain the increased
presidential assertions of the authority to decline to defend
legislation. °2
6. Independent Presidential Powers of Interpretation-The
President's duty to execute laws, including those enumerated
within the Constitution, necessarily implies an authority to
interpret the Constitution independently. 23 The Constitution
provides that the President "may require the Opinion, in
writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Depart-
ments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their
respective Offices."20 4 These powers permit inquiry into the
constitutionality of statutes even after legislation has been
passed.0 5
Constitutional interpretations by the President are not
limited to statutes that solely implicate executive powers.
200. See 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55, 59 (1980).
201. See discussion supra Part II.C.
202. Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802,
826-28 (1982) (suggesting that the institutional structure of the Supreme Court, with
its changing membership and shifting coalitions, makes it impossible for the Court to
render consistent decisions); McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function, supra note 68,
at 383 (noting limitations of relying on Supreme Court constitutional jurisprudence).
The Court has noted its own limitations regarding its ability to enforce constitutional
norms. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 539-47
(1985) (declining enforcement of the Tenth Amendment in part because it was unable
to draw principled lines between "traditional" protected and unprotected state functions).
203. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) ("In the performance of
assigned constitutional duties each branch of the Government must initially interpret
the Constitution . . . ."); see also Op. Off. Legal Counsel 2 (Nov. 2, 1994) ("[Ihe
President can and should exercise his independent judgment to determine whether the
statute is constitutional"); EASTLAND, supra note 61, at 70 ("Rejecting advice based on
those precedents that he had no choice but to sign the bill, [President] Jackson correctly
observed in his veto message that he had taken an oath of office to support the
Constitution 'as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others.' "); McGinnis,
Models of the Opinion Function, supra note 68, at 411 (quoting President Lincoln's
conviction that an executive owes greatest deference to his own convictions when
exercising his interpretive authority); Miller, supra note 131, at 36; cf. Freytag v.
Commissioner 501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[Tihe means [available
to the President] to resist legislative encroachment . . . [include] the power to veto
encroaching laws or even to disregard them when they are unconstitutional." (citations
omitted)).
204. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
205. See 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55, 60 (1980) (stating that nothing in the
statutorily defined duties of the attorney general "either requires or forbids him to
inquire into the constitutionality of statutes"). But see 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 11, 14 (1937)
("iThere rarely can be proper occasion for the rendition of an opinion by the Attorney
General upon [a statute's] constitutionality after it has become law.").
WINTER AND SPRING 19971 Presidential Non-Defense of Statutes 633
Presidents have established the authority to evaluate
independently the merits of statutes affecting a range of
constitutional rights.2 °6 President Clinton exercised this
independent interpretive authority when evaluating equal
protection arguments against the HIV provision.20 7
Furthermore, executive interpretation may reflect the nation-
al will more than judicial interpretation because the President
is the nation's elected executive, and consequently his interpre-
tation will reflect greater sensitivity to political concerns.20 ' For
example, the discussion in Part II.C suggests that a court could
have upheld the HIV provision as constitutional.20 9 Yet public
opinion reflected strong opposition to the ban as discriminato-
ry.210 President Clinton's determination that the ban was uncon-
stitutional, therefore, more accurately reflected the public will.
7. Veto Was Impractical-President Clinton vetoed the
defense bill when it was first presented, citing the HIV provi-
sion as one of his reasons for objecting to the legislation.21' This
initial veto raised little legal controversy. A President may veto
legislation on any ground.2 12 In addition, objections based on
more tenuous constitutional challenges may be asserted at the
veto stage because the President's action will not be subject to
legal challenge or subsequent court rejection. 3
The veto is the most powerful instrument available to the
President to register objections to legislation.214 Moreover, the
206. See supra Part II.B. (discussing cases in which courts have not questioned
presidential independent constitutional interpretive authority).
207. See Signing Statement, supra note 4 at 261 ("I have concluded that this
discriminatory provision is unconstitutional.").
208. See McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function, supra note 68, at 403-06
(arguing that the unique political interests of the executive branch in constitutional
interpretation serve as an appropriate check on the judiciary). The President's constitu-
tional interpretations may also reflect the national will more accurately than those
offered by Congress. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 123 (1926) ("[I]t may be,
at some times, on some subjects, that the President elected by all the people is rather
more representative of them all than are the members of either body of the Legislature
whose constituencies are local and not countrywide ... .
209. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
210. See discussion supra Part I.C.
211. See Message to the House, supra note 22, at 2234. See generally Lou Chibbaro,
Jr., President Declares HIV Ban Unconstitutional, WASH. BLADE, Feb. 16, 1996, at 19.
212. A President need not limit himself to objections based on an interference with
his own constitutional authority. See EASTLAND, supra note 61, at 69-70 (noting that
the veto "not only serves as a shield to the executive, but it furnishes an additional
security against the enaction of improper laws" (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 217
(Alexander Hamilton) (Ray P. Fairfield ed., 1981))).
213. See McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function, supra note 68, at 388, 431.
214. See Garber & Wimmer, supra note 189, at 372 (asserting that the veto is the
sole method available to the President to object to legislation).
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oath of office arguably imposes a constitutional requirement on
the President to veto legislation that he believes is unconstitu-
tional.215
The veto may not be a practical option, however, with respect
to legislation containing critically needed provisions or exhibit-
ing only partial constitutional deficiencies.216 The $256 billion
defense authorization bill presented President Clinton with
such a predicament.217 The ultimate decision to sign the bill,
but not to defend the ban, followed the ten-day presentment
period during which the Administration struggled to find a way
to attain enactment of the vital military provisions, yet oppose
the "completely abhorrent and offensive" HIV provision.2 s In
the end, the need for defense funding made a second veto
impractical.21 9
8. Ensures Debate over Constitutional Principles-Where
the President has the authority to interpret the Constitution
independently, he promotes debate between the branches of
government over constitutional norms.220 Not only might such
215. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (requiring the President to uphold the Con-
stitution).
In addition, by not vetoing legislation, one could argue that a President tacitly is
approving of the statute's constitutionality such that no further objection may be raised.
But cf Op. Off. Legal Counsel 6 (Nov. 3, 1993) (discussing and asserting the view that
the President is not under an absolute duty to veto legislation containing an unconstitu-
tional provision).
216. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Judges Should Pay Attention to Statements by Presi-
dent, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 10, 1986, at 13 (arguing that the veto "comports less well with
legislation for which there is great necessity or that contains serious, but less extensive,
constitutional problems"); Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC's Opinion Writing Function: The
Legal Adhesive for a Unitary Executive, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 337, 347-48 (1993) ("[T]he
veto may be practically unavailable in the face of Congress' practice of lumping together
numerous unrelated provisions in omnibus bills, often inserting the most controversial
provisions in emergency appropriations measures passed at, or after, fiscal deadlines.").
217. See discussion supra Part I.A.
218. See Mitchell, supra note 24, at Al (quoting White House Counsel Jack Quinn).
219. A presidential line-item veto for substantive policy items, with a congressional
override provision, might eliminate the power imbalance that results when Congress
attaches riders with which the President disagrees to legislation that the President
believes is imperative. Presidential authority to decline to defend the rider provides
greater protection for congressional legislating authority, however, because the law may
be enforced and implemented by a majority vote of Congress, rather than by the two-
thirds vote required to override a veto.
220. See Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES 231-32 (1988):
Under the doctrine of 'coordinate construction,' the President and members of
Congress have both the authority and the competence to engage in constitutional
interpretation, not only before the courts decide but afterwards as well. All three
branches perform a valuable, broad, and ongoing function in helping to shape the
meaning of the Constitution.
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debate be productive, it actually might prevent usurpations of
authority by a particular branch.22' When President Clinton
declined to defend the HIV provision, he ensured debate over
the equal protection issue that had been ignored previously by
Congress. 222 This debate ultimately led to the repeal. The non-
defense decision also established an opportunity for a legal
challenge to be brought, in which all three branches of govern-
ment would be involved in the debate.223 Furthermore, by
announcing his decision to the public, the President ensured
public participation in the debate. If the President's decision
had been unpopular, he would have expended political capital;
fear of unnecessary expenditure might serve as the ultimate
check on a President's actions.
9. Inappropriate Link to Funding-The Constitution gives
Congress the authority to assert funding power over the other
branches, 224 and such authority may serve as an effective check
where those branches arguably overstep their authority. Con-
gress' ultimate control of the government purse strings prevents
the President from abusing his authority to decline to defend
legislation. For example, Congress may use this control to limit
the Attorney General from attacking congressional statutes,
including restricting her funds or even revoking her litigating
authority.
25
President Clinton's decision-to sign a provision he consid-
ered unconstitutional because it was attached to a needed def-
ense appropriations bill-demonstrates how effective Congress'
221. See McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function, supra note 68, at 393.
222. Such renewed debate is particularly important where, as here, Congress failed
to deliberate over the provision. See discussion supra Part I.A.
223. Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger acknowledged the opportunity
created by President Clinton's decision for full debate on the HIV provision. See
Quinn/Dellinger Briefing, supra note 35, at 3 ("[Tlhe action the President is taking, if
the leadership of the House and Senate choose to defend this provision, will ensure that
the courts are presented with a full range of argument in making their determina-
tion.").
224. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
225. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 96-132, § 21, 93 Stat. 1040 (1979) (appropriations bill
requiring notification from Attorney General to Congress whenever Justice Department
considered a congressional statute unconstitutional and requiring a declaration that her
decision constitutes the view of the executive branch); Pub. L. No. 95-624, § 13, 92 Stat.
3459 (1978) (appropriations bill requiring notification from the Attorney General to
Congress whenever the Justice Department would not support constitutionality of a
federal statute in court).
Such actions may raise additional constitutional issues, however, namely to what
extent Congress may regulate the executive branch. See Miller & Bowman, supra note
82, at 78.
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funding power can be.226 Such efforts by Congress to attach ill-
considered provisions to large funding bills may increase the
frequency of non-defense of statutes by the executive branch.227
In the past, where Congress has attached to badly needed
legislation provisions that the President finds objectionable,
executive decisions not to defend the legislation have resulted.
For example, Lovett22 s involved a conflict between a conserva-
tive Congress and a liberal President, with Congress asserting
its control of the purse strings by attaching an offensive statu-
tory provision to necessary funding.229 President Roosevelt
signed the act, but did not defend the provision.23 ° Passage of
the HIV provision represents a similarly improper leveraging
of congressional funding authority, resulting in a presidential
decision not to defend the legislation.231
10. Power Rarely Exercised-Presidential authority to
decline to defend legislation that the President deems "proba-
bly" unconstitutional raises concerns that because there are no
objective standards by which to evaluate presidential action the
executive will overuse this authority. In practice, however, the
executive branch rarely has exercised its power not to defend
unconstitutional statutes.232
226. The provision was repealed in a similarly necessary funding bill. See Pianin &
Harris, supra note 42, at Al.
227. Cf A Law Not Worth Defending, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Feb. 14, 1996, at 47A,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (noting that from time to time "Con-
gress forces dubiously constitutional laws down a president's throat" in important
funding bills and that when, under these circumstances, Presidents may decline to
enforce or defend those laws).
228. United States v. Lovett, 328 US. 303 (1946).
229. See Ely, supra note 61, at 1; Arthur Krock, Congress is Re-invoking the Power
of the Purse, N.Y. TndES, May 28, 1943, at 20.
230. See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 313 (describing President Roosevelt's opinion that the
statute was unconstitutional); see also discussion supra Part II.B.
231. President Clinton relied upon Lovett in his decision not to defend the HIV
provision, noting President Roosevelt's decision to sign the important funding bill while
opposing a provision that he believed infringed on individual constitutional rights. See
Signing Statement, supra note 4, at 261.
232. See Gavett v. Alexander, 477 F. Supp. 1035, 1044 (D.D.C. 1979) ("While
occasionally the Executive Branch has declined to defend laws it considered to be
unconstitutional ... such occasions are exceedingly rare."); Note, supra note 52, at
1000.
For example, in both Rostker and Thomasson, the executive branch initially opposed
Congress' restrictions on military eligibility for women and gay men respectively. In
both cases, however, after debate and deliberation in the drafting stage, the Justice
Department ultimately defended the legislation in court as constitutional. See Rostker
v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 58, 60-61 (1981); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 919,
921-23 (4th Cir. 1996).
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C. Non-Defense is Consistent with Democratic Theory
Part III.B demonstrated that presidential authority to decline
to defend legislation promotes principles of democratic theory.
First, such authority does not circumvent separation of powers
principles by leaving congressional or judicial interests unpro-
tected. Second, public accountability of the executive branch is
ensured. Consequently, it makes sense to allow a President
discretion to balance his duty to execute the laws with his duty
to uphold the Constitution as the supreme law of the land
where the President determines that a law is "probably" uncon-
stitutional and Congress has failed to deliberate over the
constitutional issue.
As the discussion above reveals, presidential assertions of this
authority may be based more on practical necessity or on
political considerations than on a sincere constitutional objec-
tion. While the same democratic principles continue to be
promoted in these instances, additional arguments in favor of
non-defense authority are also apparent. First, controversial or
unpopular provisions inserted in critically needed omnibus
funding bills may place a thumb too heavily on the scale in
favor of Congress. This is particularly true where, as with the
HIV provision, the constitutional issues are ill-considered and
the provision fails to incorporate the views of the public at
large. Presidential authority to decline to defend statutes serves
to rebalance the authority between the branches. Second,
allowing a President to incorporate policy or political consider-
ations into his constitutional evaluation ensures that the
branch most readily able to respond to public sentiment is able
to do so, particularly where Congress fails adequately to consid-
er an issue. The discretion to decline to defend legislation of
dubious constitutionality ensures that the President plays a
leadership role in guiding constitutional policy. At the same
time, with congressional defense ensured, minority views
remain protected. The courts are then able to resolve the issue
after considering the strongest arguments on both sides. In con-
trast, the courts might not benefit from such strong opposing
arguments if the executive branch were forced to defend legisla-
tion that it vehemently opposed.
Ultimately, this type of struggle between the government
branches is not new. Presidents have established the authority
to decline to defend statutes, whether based on sincere
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constitutional objections or practical or political reality. The
practice reflects the flexible nature of our democratic institu-
tions. The other branches of the federal government are able to
adapt, and indeed have adapted, to the reality of presidential
assertions of this authority.
CONCLUSION
President Clinton's decision to decline to defend the HlV
provision presents further evidence of executive branch efforts
to establish a lower threshold of unconstitutionality for presi-
dential non-defense of legislation. In contrast to presidential
decisions declining to enforce legislation, the emerging standard
for non-defense of statutes does not require existing precedent
on the constitutional issue concerned, nor does it require the
absence of valid arguments in support of the legislation. Rather,
the executive branch has established the authority to decline to
defend legislation where it evaluates the constitutionality of the
statute against judicial precedent and determines that the
statute is probably unconstitutional.
A lower threshold for non-defense of statutes is appropriate
as a matter of law and policy. Presidents have asserted the
authority to decline to defend legislation, establishing a practice
to which courts have acquiesced. The authority satisfies separa-
tion of powers concerns and promotes democratic principles.
Where Congress has failed to deliberate adequately over legisla-
tion, and the executive branch believes that the statute is
probably unconstitutional, a lower threshold evens the scales
between the two branches and facilitates the opportunity for
deliberation among all three branches of the federal govern-
ment.
